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Cognitive Radio (CR) technology is considered as a promising technology to overcome 
spectrum scarcity problem in wireless networks, by sharing the spectrum between both unlicensed 
users (secondary users, (SUs)) and licensed users (primary users, (PUs)), provided that the SUs 
respect the PUs’ rights to use the spectrum exclusively. 
An important technical area in cognitive radio networks (CRNs) is wireless security. A 
secure CRN must meet different security requirements, which are: confidentiality, integrity, 
availability and authentication. Data confidentiality is a mandatory requirement in cognitive radio 
networks, generally to maintain the privacy of the data owner (PU or SU). Integrity means that 
data is transmitted from the source to the destination without alteration. While availability is to 
release the channels assigned to one SU as soon as a PU wants to use its spectrum. Authentication 
in CRN means that each node has to authenticate itself before it can use the available spectrum 
channels. 
New classes of security threats and challenges in CRNs have been introduced that target 
the different layers of OSI model and affect the security requirements. Providing strong security 
may prove to be the most difficult aspect of making CR a long-term commercially-viable concept. 
Protection of routes used for data transmission is a critical prerequisite to ensure the robustness of 
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the routing process. Therefore, route discovery must be done in such a way that lets each node find 
the best secure path(s) for its data transmission. 
In this work, network security of CRN is improved through proposing different models that 
are built to fulfil the security requirements mentioned above. Improving the network security 
enhances the network performance, taking into consideration the quality of service (QoS) desired 
by the different network nodes such as bandwidth and time delay. This work aims to combine the 
spectrum sensing phase and the spectrum management phase, as well as to detect all the adversary 
nodes that slow down the network performance by selectively holding and not forwarding packets 
to their next hop(s). We measure the network node’s reliability for using network resources 
through a value called belief level (BL), which is considered as the main parameter for our entire 
work. BL is used to monitor the nodes’ behavior during the spectrum sensing phase, and then it is 
used to form the best path(s) during the spectrum management phase. Particularly, this work 
follows a hierarchical structure that has three different layers. At the bottom layer, a novel 
authentication mechanism is developed to fulfil the authentication and the availability security 
requirements, which ends assigning a belief level (BL) to each node. At the middle layer, the 
nodes’ behavior during the spectrum sensing phase is monitored to detect all the adversary node(s). 
Finally, at the top layer, a novel routing algorithm is proposed that uses the nodes’ security (BL) 
as a routing metric. SUs collaborate with each other to monitor other nodes’ behavior. Users’ data 
confidentiality and integrity are satisfied through this hierarchical structure that uses the cluster-
based, central authority, and nodes collaboration concepts. By doing so, the traffic carried in the 
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1. Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Since 2000, the number of subscriptions for commercial mobile services in Canada has more than 
tripled, increasing by an average of 1.5 million per year over the last decade [1]. In fact, the 
increase in mobile subscriptions has been accompanied by the adoption of more sophisticated 
mobile devices, such as smart phones and tablets, which provide access to the Internet. Canadians 
are among the most ardent adopters of these types of devices. Figure 1.1 shows the number of 
smart phone users compared to the number of population in Canada for the period of 2014-2018 
[2]. It is projected that by 2018, about two thirds of Canadians will be using smart phones. The 
number of mobile internet subscriptions in Canada has already increased from 3.8 million in 2011 
to around 14 million in 2015. In fact, the Cisco Visual Networking Index [3] has shown that by 
the end of 2013, the number of mobile-connected devices has already exceeded the world's 
population, and that by 2017, video content will represent sixty-six percent of total mobile traffic. 
Spectrum is a limited resource, and the "usable" spectrum range (given current technologies) is 
completely allocated to existing services. As a result, Canada must rely on a combination 
of demand-side and supply-side measures in order to meet the spectrum needs of new or growing 
services. 
On the supply-side, the supply of spectrum has to be managed by reallocating limited spectrum 
resources between radio services. On the demand-side, licensees must use existing spectrum 
allocations more efficiently in order to provide improved service without requiring additional 
spectrum resources. Improved efficiency of spectrum use can be achieved by optimizing 
infrastructure deployment (for example, increasing network density in order to increase frequency 
reuse) or by adopting innovative technologies (such as 5G wireless mobile broadband technologies 
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or Cognitive Radio (CR) technology). Figure 1.2 illustrates the rapid spectrum demand to support 
commercial use in Canada for the period of 2011-2017. 
 
Figure 11.1:  Smartphone Users in Canada (2014-2018) [2] 
 
Figure 1.2:  Spectrum Demand to Support Commercial Use for 2011-2017 in Canada [1] 
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In order to increase the spectrum utilization in an efficient way, new spectrum sharing models 
must be produced that allow sharing the spectrum among both types of users, the unlicensed users 
(secondary users, (SUs)) and the licensed users (primary users, (PUs)), while the SUs respect the 
rights of the PUs. Many solutions have been introduced to overcome the spectrum scarcity 
problem. Amongst the many, dynamic spectrum access (DSA) is one of them, wherein the 
spectrum is dynamically utilized. It enables users to adjust communication parameters (such as 
operating frequency, transmission power, modulation scheme) in response to the changes in the 
wireless environment [4-6]. DSA permits unlicensed users access the unused spectrum bands, 
which affects the security levels in the cognitive radio networks (CRNs). 
As in any other type of wireless networks, CRNs are vulnerable to many security attacks (both 
passive and active) especially during the spectrum sensing phase. The radio technology itself is 
vulnerable to attacks as any radio frequency can be blocked or jammed when a transmitter sends 
a signal of adequate strength at the same frequency. There is no control over the behavior of these 
unlicensed users, which threatens the security of the licensed users. The most important behaviors 
of attackers can be categorized into the following: (i) misbehaving, (ii) selfish (iii) cheating, or (iv) 
malicious [7]. An attacker can behave in one of these ways during spectrum sensing such as 
emulating PUs or sending false sensing results. The attacker aims to prevent other nodes from 
utilizing the spectrum efficiently, keep network resources for its own benefits, reduce the QoS of 
other nodes, and degrade the network security and performance.  
Due to the importance of the security issue in the context of CRN, it has recently received interest 
from researchers [8]. Particularly during the spectrum sensing phase, new attacks have been 
introduced wherein malicious nodes exploit the vulnerability of the reliability issues, mentioned 
above, to attack the CRN. Any attack is the result of an attacker’s behavior. The attack is active 
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when a network node is in an attacker’s behavior category and when it is affecting the network 
security. In all other circumstances, the attack is passive and the adversary node is waiting for a 
chance to switch to an active attack. 
The main focus of this research is to address the different attack behaviors that lead to multiple 
attacks other than addressing each attack separately. We develop a multi-layered model that 
improves the network performance measures, increases the network security, reduces the 
opportunity for malicious nodes to attack the CR network, and implicitly enhances the spectrum 
utilization and network throughput. 
1.1 Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs)  
Networks that use the cognitive radio (CR) technology are referred to as cognitive radio 
networks (CRNs). The principle of Cognitive Radio (CR) was firstly mentioned and explained by 
J. Mitola [9]. Cognitive Radio is defined as an efficient technology that allows more users to use 
the available spectrum. It is a radio that can change its transmitter parameters based on interaction 
with the environment in which it operates. The two characteristics that are unique to CR are the 
cognitive capability and its re-configurability [9]. Cognitive capability represents the ability for 
the radio technology to capture or sense the information from its radio environment. Through this 
capability, the spectrum portions that are unused at specific locations or times can be identified. 
Re-configurability represents the ability of the CR to adapt any changes in its environment, which 
enables the radio to be dynamically programmed due to the radio environment. 
As most of the spectrum is assigned to specific users (i.e. primary users (PUs)), the most 
important challenge is to share the licensed spectrum between the licensed users (PUs) and the 
unlicensed users (secondary users (SUs)). 
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Cognitive radio techniques provide the capability to use or share the spectrum in an opportunistic 
manner. The SUs have to detect the unused spectrum bands, which are known as spectrum holes, 
and this process is called spectrum sensing. Spectrum sensing is recognized as the basic 
functionality provided by CR. In the spectrum sensing process, the SUs continue to monitor the 
channel(s) that are owned by the PU(s). Once a channel is available, the SUs can start to use it. 
Despite the high-power levels consumed during the spectrum sensing process, the spectrum 
sensing results should be accurate, which helps the SUs in using the free frequency bands of PUs. 
Although the major motivation of cognitive radio (CR) research is to manage the spectrum 
efficiently, CR is expected to be more than spectrum-agile. It is expected to convert the 
conventional radio into an intelligent agent that can learn from the radio environment and adapt 
the transmission parameters accordingly to optimize the communication performance. Spectrum 
agility is one dimension of its optimization parameters. Transmission parameters that may be 
adjusted to improve communication quality include operating frequency, modulation scheme, 
transmission power, and communication technology [8]. In [10], different Spectrum sensing 
methods and networking protocols for CRNs are summarized. 
1.2 Security in CRNs 
Unlicensed users can use the white bands of the spectrum in the absence of licensed users. There 
is no control over the behavior of these unlicensed users, which threatens the security of the 
licensed users. A node can exploit the vulnerability of the CRN’s reliability and its lack of control 
in order to attack the different layers of the communication protocol. 
There are many concepts that should be applied to satisfy a secure communication among 
cognitive radio network nodes, which are referred to as security requirements: confidentiality, 
integrity, availability and authentication [11]. 
6 
 
Confidentiality means to protect information to prevent unauthorized revelations to systems or 
individuals. Data confidentiality is a mandatory requirement in CRNs generally to maintain the 
privacy of the data owner (PU or SU) as the data owner can include a bank storing credit and 
balance information about a customer [8]. Moreover, as radio is the communication medium in 
CRN which makes it open for access and easy to be attacked, confidentiality should be guaranteed 
for each connection. 
Integrity is the property of ensuring that information will not be accidentally or maliciously 
altered or destroyed. It means that data is transmitted from the source to the destination without 
alteration [12]. The message can only be altered by the sender without detection by other nodes. 
Integrity protects against unauthorized creation, alteration or destruction of data. If it was possible 
for a corrupted message to be accepted, then this would show up as a violation of the integrity 
property [13]. 
Availability means to allow the network users to use the network for their own transmissions 
and to monitor the traffic in the network [8]. In CRN, when PUs are not using their spectrum 
channels, other users (SUs) can use these channels. However, once a PU wants to use its channels 
again all SUs have to leave immediately to make the channels available. 
Authentication is the verification process of the claimed identity of a principal [14]. It is the 
primary security property; since, other properties often rely on accurate authentication. In CRN, 
each node has to authenticate itself before it can use the available spectrum channels. One access 
point manages the authentication process, wherein all SUs identify themselves to the access point. 
The previous security requirements should be fulfilled through the different CR phases, such as 
spectrum sensing phase and spectrum management phase. 
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The first step in using the spectrum is the spectrum sensing phase, which is considered to be a 
cataleptic context for malicious nodes to arise and attack the CRN. The two security issues in PUs 
signals’ detection are misdetection and false detection [8]. False detection is when an SU records 
the presence of a PU in its band, when in fact it is a malicious node posing as a PU that sends 
strong signals to SUs. Misdetection issue is the opposite of the false detection issue.  
The second step in using the spectrum is the spectrum management phase, which includes 
finding the best paths between communicating nodes in the network. There are two different 
aspects of security that need to be considered in the design of routing algorithms or protocols in 
CRNs. The first aspect is to secure the routing algorithm or protocol itself (i.e. securing the route 
establishment, route maintenance, and data forwarding processes) by encrypting the control and 
data messages sent over the different paths. The second aspect is to consider security as a routing 
metric in order to find the best nodes to form the best path. To the best of our knowledge, the 
second aspect has not been applied in CRNs [15]. 
The issues previous mentioned are examples of security issues that can arise and make CRN a 
more challenging solution. Stronger security mechanisms should avoid the harmful effects of 
different attacks such as overhearing other users’ information, interfering with other users’ 
transmission signals and degrading the quality of service of licensed users. With these harmful 
effects, the spectrum scarcity problem will increase. CR technology is intended to prevent these 
effects and in turn, diminish the spectrum scarcity problem. 
1.3 Motivation 
In this section, we summarize the motivations that encouraged us to research in the area of CRNs 
mainly in monitoring nodes behavior during the spectrum sensing and the spectrum management 
phases in order to secure the communication among the different networks users and detect the 
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misbehaving nodes. First, to the best of our knowledge, most of literature focuses on improving 
the spectrum sensing process to defend attacks that might occur during this process. Second, 
despite the significant importance of previous research, no studies have addressed the attacks that 
occur after the completion of spectrum sensing phase. Third, due to the effective conniving 
behavior of malicious nodes during the first two phases, nodes behavior after the completion of 
the spectrum sensing process should be considered. Fourth, none of the previous work penalizes 
the misbehaving nodes; the main focus is to identify the misbehaving nodes and disconnecting 
them from the network. The fifth factor is that other research work focuses on detecting one type 
of attack. In addition, there is no standard detection technique to identify and mitigate the attacker’s 
behavior rather than the attack, itself. The sixth factor is that other routing protocols in CRNs do 
not consider the security level of nodes participating in data transmission as a routing metric. Their 
main focus is to minimize the cost and reduce the packets’ transmission time between the source 
and destination. Although this is important, any path between the source and the destination nodes 
must be secured as much as possible in order to guarantee the data delivery with no alteration. Last 
but not the least, in order to build a general detection technique and a secure routing protocol 
among the network users, a node authentication process has to be completed as soon as a node 
joins the network. This authentication process has to prevent attacks from having the chance to 
occur later. If they do have the opportunity to occur after, the detection technique would detect 
them easily and faster. These factors inspired the idea to develop a hierarchal structure that contains 
three layers, which work together to secure the communication carried over CRNs, to improve the 
network reliability and efficiency, and to implicitly increase the network utilization. 
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1.4 Problem Statement and Research Goal 
The radio technology itself is vulnerable to attacks as any radio frequency can be blocked or 
jammed when a transmitter sends a signal of adequate strength at the same frequency. As any other 
type of wireless networks, CRNs are vulnerable to many security attacks, such as denial of service 
attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and reflection attack. Unlicensed users can use the white bands 
of the spectrum in the absence of licensed users. There is no control over the behavior of these 
unlicensed users, which threatens the security of the licensed users. A node can use the 
vulnerability of CRN reliability to attack the different layers of communication protocol. 
Failing in spectrum sensing results, in terms of false detection or misdetection, might cause 
substantial interference for those who use the spectrum. On the other hand, wrong results of the 
spectrum sensing lead to inefficient spectrum utilization. More efficient and effective methods for 
detecting spectrum holes, when the CRN is highly dynamic, need to be developed. If the spectrum 
sensing is made by each secondary individually, the probability of collecting accurate sensing 
results is low. This probability is increased by applying the cooperation concept among the 
different secondary users. Cooperative spectrum sensing helps in achieving higher accurate and 
correct sensing results. Additionally, it prevents the negative impacts on performance caused by 
multipath fading and shadowing. Cooperative spectrum sensing allows the secondary users to 
share their initial decisions about the vacant spectrum bands and then proceed to make their final 
decisions. Therefore, any adversary nodes that participate in spectrum sensing can be identified 
and eliminated.  
Moreover, adversary nodes may act normal during the spectrum sensing phase and then target the 
network during the data transmission phase.  During the spectrum management phase, this 
detrimental behavior must be prevented. Routing is an important part of the spectrum management 
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phase as all paths between any communicating network nodes are established. Routing in CRNs 
differs from traditional routing protocols in ad-hoc networks. There are many challenges related 
to CR technology itself or to the environment where the CR is applied, including the dynamic 
changes of spectrum availability, the instable behavior of PUs and SUs, resources heterogeneity, 
and the ability of synchronizing the different network nodes. Thus, traditional routing protocols in 
ad-hoc networks cannot be directly applied in CRNs as that will result in poor network 
performance in terms of end-to-end delay, packet delivery ratio and throughput. 
With that being said, the research goal is to secure the data transmission in CRNs. In other words, 
it aims to prevent all adversary nodes from behaving abnormally either by eavesdropping on the 
messages sent over the different spectrum channels, altering, dropping, or falsely injecting them. 
Moreover, it aims to effectively share the spectrum among the different network nodes during the 
spectrum management phase relying on the nodes’ behavior during the spectrum sensing phase. 
1.5 General System Overview 
This section presents the general form and assumptions of the system that are considered in this 
research. Figure 1.3 illustrates our system which is a network that has M SUs divided into K 
different clusters based on their geographical locations wherein each cluster has a unique identifier 
(Cluster ID) within the network. The fusion center (FC) controls the traffic over the network. In 
each cluster, one node is chosen by FC as a cluster head (CH). Any secondary user that wants to 
join the network has to be authenticated before it can use the network. Any SU can communicate 
with any node in the network (i.e. other SUs, CH, and the FC). Authentication is the process of 
validating the identity of the new or returning node(s) to the network. The joining node has to pass 
through the authentication process at the fusion center level and at the cluster head level. We 
assume that SUs can sense the PUs’ spectrum accurately, and all of them are trusted nodes. We 
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assume the CH cannot get compromised. If a CH gets offline, the FC will select another node in 






Figure 1.3:  Network Overview. 
The size for each channel is measured in hertz. The channel capacity, which represents the 
bandwidth or the data rate, is measured in bits/sec. In order to guarantee security in CRNs, we use 
two different methodologies: public key infrastructure-based and symmetric key cryptography. 
The common pre-defined control channel that is used as a communication channel was chosen for 
the following reasons: 
• To send the spectrum sensing results between the different SUs in the spectrum sensing 
phase. 
• To send the channel request and response messages between the SUs, FC and CHs in the 
authentication, sensing, and routing phases. 
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• To send the neighboring nodes information from FC to SUs in the sensing and routing 
phases. 
• To send the routing requests and replies during the creation of the paths. 
1.6 System Requirements and General Assumptions 
The first step in cognitive radio networks is the spectrum sensing, wherein each SU 
explores the channels that are assigned for a specific PU and uses its own techniques in 
order to determine the absence or presence of the PU. The requirements of the system and 
its users are defined as well as the assumptions applied to our model. 
1.6.1 System Requirements  
Each secondary user (SU) would like to use any channel that is assigned to any PU in the 
network. The identity of all the nodes that use the spectrum has to be verified before any 
node granted a permission to access the spectrum. All messages exchanged during the 
spectrum sensing phase have to be encrypted, and only authorized nodes can decrypt them. 
Any node that wants to use the spectrum has to pass through two levels of identity 
verification. Specific nodes are selected to control the authentication process. 
1.6.2 General Assumptions 
In order to guarantee security in CRNs, we assume that the public key-infrastructure-based 
and symmetric-key cryptography are used for encrypting the messages exchanged in the 
authentication process. The symmetric key will be assigned to each node during the 
authentication process. Each node uses the same symmetric key for encoding and decoding 
the messages after it is shared among them. When a node sends a message to another node 
in the network, this message will be encrypted with the symmetric key. Meanwhile, the 
receiver decrypts this message by using the same symmetric key. Channels carrying the 
13 
 
messages are error-free and all messages are received correctly by the recipient. A node’s 
certificate is generated and validated through a certificate authority, server S, known to all 
the nodes similar as in TLS protocols [16]. The certificate authority, server S, grants a 
certificate to each node after it has been manufactured. The node’s certificate includes its 
logic identifier, its MAC address and a pair of its public/private keys. As each node’s 
certificate is signed by the key of the certificate authority, each node contacts the certificate 
authority, server S, to validate other nodes’ certificate(s). During the certificate validation, 
each node gets all the node information from the certificate authority, server S, except the 
node’s private key which is not shared with any other node in the network. 
1.7 The Threat Model 
In our system, an abnormal node might behave in one or more of the four different behavior 
categories (ways) to threaten the network in order to degrade the network security and 
performance. The threat model will be as following: 
• A node behaves in a malicious, misbehaving, cheating, and/or selfish way to launch 
PUE attack by emulating one PU through sending signals over the spectrum channels. 
• A node behaves in a malicious, misbehaving, cheating, and/or selfish way to launch 
SSDF attack by sending false sensing results to other nodes. 
• Multiple collusive nodes behave in a malicious, misbehaving, cheating, and/or selfish 
way to launch collusion attack by sending false reputation reports about benign nodes 




• One or multiple nodes may behave in a malicious, misbehaving, cheating, and/or selfish 
way to launch DoS attack by sending any data over the spectrum channels in order to 
reduce the chance for other nodes from using the spectrum for their data transmission. 
• One or multiple adversary nodes may behave in a malicious, misbehaving, cheating, 
and/or selfish way to launch objective function attack by trying to change the radio 
parameters such as center frequency, bandwidth, power, modulation type, coding rate, 
channel access protocol, encryption type, and frame size in order to reduce the network 
performance and security. There are three goals that the radio wants to achieve: low 
power, high data rate, and secure communication. Depending on the application, each 
of these goals has a different weight. Therefore, the adversary nodes try different 
combinations of input parameters, measure the observed statistics such as bit error rate, 
and then evaluate the objective functions to see which inputs give the best results for 
their application. 
1.8 Objectives and Contributions  
This section includes the detailed objectives and contributions of this work. 
1.8.1  Research Objectives 
 The principal goal of this work is to improve the communication performance of CRN as well 
as securing the data transmission in CRNs. To achieve this goal, we will develop a versatile system 
that is capable of interacting with changes in radio environment. Efforts will be geared towards 
the following objectives: 
1. To improve the existing authentication mechanisms by developing an authentication approach 
that contributes the following: 
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• Thwarts all attackers and gives higher levels of security in the network. 
• Improves the authentication successful rate and reduces the authentication time. 
• Grants network access to authenticated nodes only, in order to reduce an opportunity for 
an attack to occur. 
2. Following the authentication mechanism, to develop a novel monitoring mechanism of nodes’ 
behavior during the spectrum sensing phase that contributes the following: 
• Determines the adversary nodes and detects different types of attacks that might target the 
network (such as PUEA, DoS, Objective Function, etc.…).  
• Improves the methods used in attacks detection and mitigation. 
• Increases the efficiency of the spectrum sensing process. 
• Improves the network security by penalizing adversary nodes. 
• Improves the network reliability and efficiency by reducing false alarm probability. 
• Increases the detection probability of free spectrum bands and the probability of detecting 
adversary nodes. 
• Improves the transmission rates of different network nodes. 
3. Based on the monitoring nodes’ behavior technique that uses the authentication process, a 
novel routing algorithm is developed that contributes the following: 
• Ensures a secure routing of packets among the communicating nodes. 
• Enhances the spectrum utilization and efficiency.  
• Increases the number of users that use the spectrum. 
• Limits the number of messages being exchanged. 
• Improves the network performance in terms of end-to-end delay, packet loss ratio, packet 
delivery ratio, and routing overhead. 
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1.8.2 Key Contributions 
Although much research has been done in this area in different aspects, cognitive radio is 
considered to be a rich area for research. Despite the importance of the security issue in the context 
of CRN, it received less interest from researchers. Most of the research that has been done in the 
security of CRN was during the spectrum sensing process and it focused on identifying one or at 
most two attacks that simultaneously occur. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first 
that considers the attacker’s behavior rather than addressing the attacks, themselves. We address 
the misbehaving, cheating, selfish, and malicious behavior of nodes that might lead to different 
attacks such as PUEA, SSDF, DoS, and Collusion attacks. By mitigating the attacker’s behavior, 
we reduce the prevalence of these multiple active or passive attacks. We merge the cooperative 
spectrum sensing and reputation systems in order to monitor the behavior of the node participating 
in the spectrum sensing process. We propose a collaborative approach for identifying and 
penalizing malicious and misbehaving node(s) during spectrum sensing phase. Moreover, we 
combine spectrum sensing phase and the routing in CRNs as it uses the nodes’ behavior during the 
spectrum sensing as a routing metric. Our goal is to ensure secure communication among the 
different network nodes and to improve the network reliability and efficiency. With these goals in 
mind, this research contributes in the following aspects of CR networks: 
1- Our first contribution is to develop an authentication mechanism that takes place when one 
node wants to join a CR network. To create this mechanism, a two-tier protocol was 
developed. The first tier is done at the fusion center (control authority) that controls all the 
traffic among all the network nodes. The second tier is at the cluster head (another control 
authority), which is responsible for fewer network nodes. This mechanism uses the existing 
encryption techniques to strengthen the authentication process, which is considered as the 
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base of a secure communication in any type of network and especially in CRN. The proposed 
approach assigns each node a value called belief level (BL) that determines its security level 
for participating in the spectrum sensing process (i.e. in Contribution 2). 
2- In the second contribution, a nodes’ behavior monitoring approach is proposed. This 
technique applies the following concepts: clustering, collaboration, two-tier authentication 
(Contribution 1), reporting belief level value, rewarding and penalty. A center point called 
fusion center (FC) is responsible for managing resources among the different network users. 
Moreover, it has the authority to penalize misbehaving nodes by taking proper action(s) 
against the attacking nodes based on the attack severity. It is a collaborative approach during 
the spectrum sensing process that focuses on monitoring the nodes behavior rather than 
addressing the attacks themselves. By addressing the nodes behavior, multiple active and 
passive attacks can be detected and mitigated. In the proposed approach, all sensing nodes 
collaborate with each other to identify the behavior of other nodes. The node’s belief level is 
updated and it will be used (in Contribution 3) as a routing metric. 
3- The third contribution is to develop a routing algorithm that uses the belief level (in 
Contributions 1 and 2) as a routing metric to establish routes between any pair of nodes that 
would like to communicate. This algorithm provides a secure routing between the network 
nodes, which leads to improved network performance as it reduces the packet loss ratio that 
might occur because of different types of attacks that selectively drop/forward packets to next 
hop(s). 
4- Last but not the least, the fourth contribution is to integrate the above contributions together 
in order to improve the network performance by establishing a complete spectrum 
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management scheme that improves the spectrum utilization and detects all the misbehaving 
nodes.  
1.9 Thesis Organization 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. A literature review about CRN security and 
different kinds of attacks that target a CRN is described in Chapter 2. Our developed model for 
authentication mechanism (Contribution 1) and its performance evaluation are presented in detail 
in Chapter 3. The developed model for monitoring nodes’ behavior during spectrum sensing 
process (Contribution 2) and its performance evaluation are shown in Chapter 4. The routing 
algorithm (Contribution 3) and its performance evaluation are included in Chapter 5. Finally, the 
conclusion of the research and some suggestions for future work are summarized in Chapter 6. 
1.10 Summary 
In this chapter, an overview on the cognitive radio and security has been presented. The 
objectives and contributions of the thesis have been presented as well. These objectives and 
contributions can be summarized as follows: 
• Proposing an authentication mechanism that can verify the identity of the nodes willing 
to use the network. 
• Monitoring nodes’ behavior during the spectrum sensing phase in order to identify the 
adversary ones and eliminate them as well as reward normally behaving nodes. 




2. Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
In this chapter, the security issues in cognitive radio networks (CRNs) are shown. The 
opportunities for security threats occurring in any mobile ad hoc network are much higher than a 
traditional wired network. Specifically, in CR networks, the threats are much more complex and 
the possibility of an attack is higher; since, the network nodes are much more intelligent by design. 
Unlicensed users can use the white bands of the spectrum in the absence of licensed users. There 
is no control over the behavior of these unlicensed users, which threatens the security of the 
licensed users. A node can use the vulnerability of CRN reliability and the absence of control to 
attack the different layers of communication protocol. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 describes the authentication process 
by showing different authentication approaches used in other wireless networks as well as in 
CRNs. Section 2.2 shows the spectrum sensing phase as well as the attacks that occur during the 
sensing phase. The spectrum management phase and the routing protocols used to share the 
spectrum are described in Section 2.3. Finally, we summarize the chapter in Section 2.4.  
2.1 Authentication Process  
The identity of any node that wants to join a CRN has to be verified before admitting the node to 
the network. This identity verification process is called authentication, which is known as one of 
the primary security requirements in wireless networks.  
2.1.1 Authentication Mechanisms in CRNs and other Networks 
Authentication process has been researched in many types of wireless networks with different 
solutions proposed. In [17], the authors proposed a dynamic user authentication scheme in 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). It allows legitimate users to request the sensor data from any 
of the sensor nodes by imposing a smaller computational load. This scheme claimed that it is secure 
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against replay and forgery attacks. However, the authors in [18] proved that the scheme proposed 
in [17] is vulnerable to replay and forgery attacks and proposed an authentication mechanism to 
overcome the drawbacks of [17]. The authors in [19] proposed a distributed node authentication 
model, wherein all the network nodes are involved in the authentication process as an 
authenticator. The main drawback of this scheme is the increased computational cost and 
communication overhead. Another authentication scheme is proposed by the authors in [20], where 
each node generates a one-way key chain and sends the commitment of it to their neighbors. If a 
node wants to send a message to its neighbors, it attaches the next authorization key from its key 
chain to the message. The receiving node can verify the validation of the key based on the 
commitment it has already received. The main drawback of this scheme is that it does not mitigate 
attacks from nodes, which are already part of the network as the adversary knows the node’s 
authorization key. The authors in [21] have proposed an authentication scheme that uses one-way 
key chain to filter false messages sent between the access point and the sensor nodes. However, 
the main disadvantage of this scheme is that it uses signature-based authentication, which requires 
synchronization and periodic broadcasting between the access points and the sensor nodes. The 
authors in [22] claimed that authentication can only be completed on the physical layer as nodes 
might not deploy similar protocols at higher layers and then authentication messages cannot be 
understood. However, in CRN nodes are capable of understanding messages on different layers as 
they run similar software which can translate messages in a way that each node can understand it. 
The authors in [23] proposed an authentication scheme that uses the node’s location information 
as a key factor to authenticate the cognitive nodes by a base station. However, it cannot be applied 
without the integration of the extensible authentication protocol (EAP). The authors in [24-26] 
have proposed a digital-signature based authentication scheme, which takes place on the physical 
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and data link layers. This authentication scheme will find and permit the trusted users existing in 
CRN to access the spectrum. Despite the importance of this work to secure the communication in 
CRN, its performance evaluation shows that the message transfer with digital signature takes a 
long time compared to normal message transfer without digital signature. In [27], a mutual 
authentication protocol based on timestamp in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) that generates a 
new session-key for each session is proposed. 
2.1.2 Analysis of Authentication Mechanisms  
The approaches discussed previously have many limitations. Firstly, they take a long time to 
complete the authentication process as they rely on digital-signature cryptography, which means 
that more messages are transferred during the authentication process. Secondly, the other 
authentication schemes focused more on authenticating the spectrum usage and/or the joining 
node; however, the user of the joining node needs to also be authenticated in order to ensure 
whether it is a legitimate user. Lastly, these authentication schemes are completed on the physical 
and data link layers only. Authentication on different layers thwarts all attackers and gives higher 
levels of security in the network. 
2.2  Security Analysis during Spectrum Sensing Phase 
As in any other type of wireless networks, CRNs are vulnerable to many security attacks (both 
passive and active) especially during the spectrum sensing phase. The radio technology itself is 
vulnerable to attacks as any radio frequency can be blocked or jammed when a transmitter sends 
a signal of adequate strength at the same frequency. There is no control over the behavior of these 
unlicensed users, which threatens the security of the licensed users. The most important behaviors 
of attackers can be categorized into the following: (i) misbehaving, (ii) selfish (iii) cheating or (iv) 
malicious [7]. If a node behaves in one of the previous categories, the node will be an adversary 
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node and it might launch multiple attacks. An attacker that behaves in one of these ways during 
spectrum sensing can emulate PUs or send false sensing results in order to prevent other nodes 
from utilizing the spectrum efficiently, keep network resources for its own benefits, reduce the 
quality of service (QoS) of other nodes, and therefore, degrade the network security and 
performance.  
2.2.1 Spectrum Sensing Process 
As spectrum sensing is the main and first step for utilizing the CR technology in an efficient way, 
security is a main issue that has to be taken into consideration. After authenticating the nodes 
willing to use the spectrum, the nodes sense the spectrum looking for free channels in order to use 
them for their data transmission. The nodes behavior during the spectrum sensing process has to 
be monitored in order to prevent any authenticated nodes from acting a misbehaving way and 
threaten the spectrum sensing process as well as degrading the network performance. Failing to 
sense the spectrum correctly might cause substantial interference for those who use the spectrum 
and consequently, leads to inefficient spectrum utilization. When the conditions of CRNs are more 
dynamic, collaborative sensing helps to detect spectrum holes faster [5]. The detection probability 
to obtain correct sensing results is increased when the cooperation concept is applied among the 
different secondary users. Additionally, cooperative spectrum sensing alleviates the negative 
impacts on performance caused by multipath fading and shadowing [4] and [28]. Every 
participating user first detects the spectrum using any spectrum sensing method such as matched 
filter, energy detection, or cyclostationary feature detection [29], followed by exchanging their 
detection decisions, and finally making sensing decision based on all the nodes’ sensing results. 
The authors in [30] study energy-efficient power allocation schemes for secondary users in 
sensing-based spectrum sharing cognitive radio systems. a cross-layer framework to jointly 
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optimize spectrum sensing and access in agile wireless networks is presented in [31]. The different 
methods used for eliminating the interference in CRNs are summarized in [32] 
2.2.2 Primary User Emulation and Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification 
Attacks 
Due to the importance of the security issue in the context of CRNs, it has recently received interest 
from researchers [8]. New attacks have been introduced that are unique to CRNs, especially during 
the spectrum sensing process, wherein malicious nodes use vulnerability of the reliability issues 
to attack a CRN. Any attack is a result of an attacker’s behavior. The attack is active when a 
network node is behaving in any of the attacker’s behaviors and is affecting the network security. 
If this is not the case, the attack is passive and the network node is waiting for a chance to switch 
to an active attack. Primary User Emulation Attack (PUEA) in [6] and [33-35] and Spectrum 
Sensing Data Falsification Attack (SSDF) in [36-38] are two examples of attacks that are unique 
to CRN, which take place during the spectrum sensing phase. These two attacks are results of the 
different attackers’ behaviors and both can be passive or active. PUEA is an active attack if a 
malicious node is emulating a PU and other nodes cannot detect it before making their own sensing 
decision. It is passive attack as long as other nodes can detect the malicious node before making 
their own sensing decision. SSDF is an active attack if a node sends false sensing results to other 
nodes or to a node that makes the final sensing decision and its false sensing results affect the final 
sensing decision. If its sensing results are not considered in making the final sensing decision, 
SSDF is a passive attack. 
In PUEA, an attacker may modify their air interface as it emulates the primary-user’s signal 
characteristics [39-40]. In this attack, other SUs will falsely determine that the frequency is in use 
by a legitimate PU. If the SUs vacate the frequency right away, then PUEA is an active attack. The 
following research addresses the active PUEA. In [41], the authors introduce a robust technique 
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based on the principal component analysis for spectrum sensing process to prevent any attack from 
targeting the network. A defense method against the PUEA is proposed in [42]. All secondary 
users in the network follow a sequence of steps until the suspect nodes are detected and excluded 
from the spectrum sensing process. In [43], a fusion center receives the sensing information from 
the different SUs in the network that uses estimation algorithms to detect the PU signals in the 
presence of the attacker. A multiple criteria scheme known as INCA for a decentralized and 
cooperative analysis of the PUEA presence in cognitive radio ad hoc networks is proposed in [44]. 
Each SU cooperates with its neighbors to detect the PUEA by broadcasting the probability of PU’s 
presence to its neighbors based on predetermined criteria such as received signal strength, 
transmission power, distance, noise, and transmission rate. This approach showed some 
improvements of the detection probability; however, the maximum value of the detection 
probability is 0.5. This is not a sufficient detection probability in order to be considered a reliable 
authentication approach. 
In SSDF, the attackers share false sensing information into the decision stream as a 
legitimate member of the network. By doing this, the attackers aim to selfishly acquire increased 
spectrum availability for themselves, or the attackers may have a goal of disrupting the throughput 
of the network for other heinous reasons. The authors in [45] propose a mitigation method for 
SSDF attack. During the sensing period, all the malicious nodes and the other SUs make their own 
decisions about the presence/absence of PUs in their bands and forward these decisions to a fusion 
center. The fusion center manages the number of accurate decisions each node needs about the 
PU; this number of times is called measure. The higher the value of the measure the less reliable 
the node’s observation is considered. The nodes with higher value of measure will be excluded 
from the following sensing results collection iteration. In [46], the authors develop a malicious 
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user detection algorithm that calculates the suspicious level of SUs and then use the suspicious 
level to eliminate the malicious users’ influence on the PU detection results. An attack-tolerant 
distributed sensing protocol that selectively filters out abnormal sensor reports and maintains the 
accuracy of incumbent detection is developed in [47]. The key idea behind this mechanism is that 
the measured primary signal strength at nearby sensors should be correlated due to shadow fading. 
The authors in [48] focus on a challenging attack scenario, wherein multiple cooperative attackers 
can overhear the honest SU sensing reports. However, the honest SUs are unaware of the existence 
of attackers. In [49], the authors propose a model for detecting the SSDF attack based on D-S 
theory for cooperative spectrum sensing method. They use the similarity degree to measure the 
evidence reliability of different users, where a low reliability means it is a malicious user and it 
will be excluded from the FC’s final decision about the spectrum. The authors in [50] use a 
bioinformatics algorithm to propose a cooperative spectrum sensing approach. The sensing nodes 
that sensed spectrum multiple times in one allocated sensing time slot forwarded their sensing 
results to a fusion center that compares them using the bioinformatics algorithm. Based on the 
comparison, a similarity index is computed for each CR user. CR users with similarity indices 
below a threshold are declared malicious and their reports are excluded from decision combination 
process. While in [51], a principal-agent-based joint spectrum sensing and access framework to 
thwart the malicious behaviors of malicious users in CR networks is proposed. 
2.2.3 Analysis of PUEA and SSDF Attacks Detection Techniques 
In the research mentioned above, there are many limitations. Firstly, the PUEA and SSDF attacks 
are addressed individually (i.e. no previous work has considered both the attacks happening at the 
same time). Their effects to the network performance are higher if they happen simultaneously; 
therefore, addressing them together has a high impact on improving the network performance. 
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Secondly, researchers focused on addressing active PUEA and SSDF (i.e. current research has not 
addressed these two attacks while they are passive). Addressing active PUEA and SSDF attacks is 
a reactive solution to attacks; since, the attacks have already occurred and degraded the network 
performance. While addressing the passive attacks works as a proactive solution because it 
contributes to the elimination of such attacks before they occur and affect the network 
performance. Thirdly, the messages carrying the sensing results are exchanged between the 
different sensing nodes in an unencrypted way, which makes it easier for adversary nodes to 
overhear, capture the sensing results and launch multiple active attacks. 
The work in [39-40] is the first work that addresses the two different attacks (PUEA and SSDF) 
while they are both active. The authors in [39-40] propose a model, which is a lightweight 
cryptographic algorithm that provides authentication and integrity to SUs’ reports. Each node 
sends its sensing results to a fusion center (FC) encrypted with a variable number of security bits, 
which depends on how certain the node is about its sensing result. Despite the importance of this 
work, it has its disadvantages. It focuses more on encrypting the sent sensing result. It does not 
consider the case when sensing nodes send a wrong sensing result through a correct encrypted 
message, in which case its sensing result will be considered correct. Moreover, it does not provide 
a solution for the cases when collusive nodes agree on sending false sensing results.  
2.2.4 Analysis of Other Attacks  
There are other attacks addressed in other types of wireless networks such as denial of 
service (DoS), collusion, and objective function attacks [8] that can also be launched in CRNs as 
a result of PUEA and/or SSDF attacks. In active DoS attack, the adversary node acts normally in 
the network to gain the trust of other nodes and then targets the network by behaving in one of the 
attacker behavior categories. Another form of DoS attack is when the adversary node emulates PU 
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signal (i.e. launches PUEA) luring other nodes to vacate the spectrum. DoS attack [52] results in 
degrading other nodes quality of service (QoS). In collusion attack, multiple adversary nodes agree 
on targeting benign node(s), which results in eliminating normal behaving nodes while adversary 
nodes keep network resources for their own use. In objective function attack, one or multiple 
adversary nodes try changing the radio parameters such as center frequency, bandwidth, or 
modulation. Addressing such attacks is important in CRNs especially during the spectrum sensing 
phase as it results in improving network performance, security, and spectrum utilization.  
2.3 Security Analysis during Spectrum Management Phase 
After the spectrum has been sensed and the free channels have been identified, the spectrum access 
has to be managed. Spectrum management is the process of regulating the use of radio frequencies 
among the different users to promote efficient use and gain a net social benefit. The research on 
cognitive radio has mostly focused on physical and data link layer issues, mainly on spectrum 
sensing and interference avoidance to PUs [53]. The authors in [54] propose an approach that 
formulate a stochastic optimization problem to integrate the power control, link scheduling, and 
routing, which minimizes the expected power consumption while guaranteeing the system 
stability. 
2.3.1 Routing Protocols and Algorithms in CRNs 
A number of challenges make the routing in CRNs differ from the traditional routing protocols in 
the ad-hoc networks. These challenges are related to two factors: the CR technology itself and the 
environment where the CR is applied. The former challenges are the dynamic changes of the 
spectrum availability and the instable behavior of the PUs and the SUs, while the latter challenges 
are the resources’ heterogeneity and the ability of synchronizing the different network nodes. Thus, 
the traditional routing protocols used in the ad-hoc networks cannot be directly applied in the 
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CRNs, as that will result in a poor network performance in terms of higher end-to-end delay, less 
packet delivery ratio, more packet loss ratio and low throughput. 
The two different routing infrastructures used in conventional networks are single-hop 
infrastructure and multi-hop infrastructure [55]. In the single-hop infrastructure, there is only one 
single path between any two nodes in the network that is used to transmit packets between the 
communicating nodes. The main advantages of single-hop infrastructure are that the routing tables 
are simpler and the packets flow smoothly. However, this infrastructure is not fault-tolerant (i.e. 
in case of any failure in the network the nodes after the failure will become unreachable and 
packets sent to them will be dropped and will not be transmitted successfully). In the multi-hop 
infrastructure, multi paths are available between any two communicating nodes, which make it 
fault-tolerant. Any failure that occurs in the network will not prevent packets from being sent 
successfully; since, there are be back-up paths that can be used for packets transmission. The main 
drawback of multi-hop infrastructure is that they are more complex to implement and that makes 
the routing tables larger. 
Multiple routing metrics can be used in both the infrastructures such as classical routing metrics 
(e.g. delay, hop count, distance, power consumption, etc.) [56] or new routing metrics that have 
been introduced based on the CRN characteristics (e.g. spectrum availability, SU interference, 
route stability, etc.) [57]. 
The end-to-end delay is considered as a routing metric in classical networks. Many factors affect 
the end-to-end delay such as queuing delay, transmission delay, and channel switching time. A 
new routing metric called the Effective Transmission Time (ETT) is proposed in [58]. It measures 
the transmission delays on a link taking into account the expected number of retransmissions, 
which effectively captures the transmission time. Another routing metric is proposed in [59] and 
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[60], which combines two concepts of delay: the time required to change the channel and the back-
off delay caused by the contention between the different nodes. The time required to change the 
channel is proportional to the difference between the initial and final channels. Another concept 
of delay, the queuing delays, has been added to the previous concepts of delay to propose another 
routing algorithm in [61-62]. Another routing algorithm that uses the delay as a routing metric is 
proposed in [63], which is referred as SEARCH. It takes the end-to-end delay as a routing metric, 
which includes the cost of switching channels and the delay over each channel. The authors in [64] 
proposes spectrum aware opportunistic routing (SAOR), another routing protocol. It uses a routing 
metric called the opportunistic link transmission (OLT) that combines three delay concepts, which 
are the link transmission delay, packet queuing delay, and link access delay. The authors in [65] 
proposed a routing based on location information and channel usage statistics. It uses a routing 
metric called cognitive transport throughput (CTT), which represents the potential relay gain over 
next hop. 
Hop count is another routing metric that is used in different routing algorithms. CAODV [66] and 
SAMER [67] are two examples of routing algorithms that use the hop count as a metric. In 
CAODV, which is an adapted version of AODV for CRNs, the regions that have active PUs are 
eliminated during the routes establishment and data forwarding phases. Therefore, the best path 
does not have active PUs. In SAMER, multiple routes are established based on the hop count; 
however, one of them is used as a best path based on spectrum availability. In [68], an on-demand 
routing scheme called split multi-path routing (SMR) is proposed. It establishes multi-routes 
between source and destination nodes wherein one of these routes has the shortest delay route. In 
[69], an on-demand node-disjoint routing algorithm (NDMR) is proposed. It builds multiple node-
disjoint paths with a low routing overhead. The authors in [70] use differential queue backlog as 
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the routing metric to achieve throughput efficiency by proposing a distributed medium access 
control algorithm. 
Many routing algorithms have used the power consumption as a routing metric, where all of them 
try to minimize the power consumed in order to find the best path for data transmission. MP-JSRA 
in [71] is an example of a routing protocol that uses the lowest data transmission cost (DTC) as a 
routing metric to find the best next node. DTC represents the weighted sum of two factors, the 
mobility cost and the interference cost to other network nodes including PUs and SUs. The authors 
in [72] propose a routing protocol called MWRP that uses the total transmission power used to 
send packets from the source to the destination as a routing metric based on the “lower-is-better” 
principle. LAUNCH in [73] is another routing protocol that uses PU activity, switching delay, and 
location information as a routing metric to find the best path between any two communicating 
nodes. 
2.3.2 Analysis of Routing Algorithms 
The main limitation of the previous research is that they do not consider security as a routing 
metric; therefore, the proposed work is the first to combine the spectrum sensing phase and the 
routing in CRNs as it uses the nodes’ behavior during the spectrum sensing as a routing metric. 
All routing protocols differ from each other in three factors: the routing metric, the environment 
where the protocol is applied, and the performance measures such as end-to-end-delay, packet 
delivery ratio, packet loss ratio, throughput, etc. 
2.4 Summary 
Any attack is a result of an attacker’s behavior. Therefore, mitigating the attackers’ behavior leads 
to detect and mitigate multiple attacks simultaneously, without addressing the attacks themselves. 
31 
 
In Table 2.1, we show the different attacks that might be launched as a result of one or multiple 
adversary nodes behaviors. 
The routing in CRNs differs from the traditional routing protocols in the ad-hoc networks due to 
multiple factors including CR dynamicity and resource heterogeneity. Therefore, if the traditional 
routing protocols used in other networks are directly applied in the CRNs, a poor network 
performance will result. Moreover, the routing protocols used in CRNs do not consider security as 
a routing metric, which threatens the security properties of the network. The spectrum can be 
shared effectively between the SUs and the PUs taking into consideration that the spectrum sensing 
phase is done correctly. Therefore, monitoring the nodes’ behavior during the spectrum sensing 
phase leads into better spectrum management. 
Table 2.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTACKS AND ADVERSARY NODES' BEHAVIOR 
Attack Name Adversary Node Behavior 
PUEA Misbehaving, Malicious, and Cheating 
SSDF Misbehaving, Cheating, and Selfish 
DoS Misbehaving, Malicious, and Selfish, Cheating 
Collusion Misbehaving, Selfish, Malicious, and Cheating 






3. Chapter 3:  A Secure and Efficient Authentication 
Mechanism 
In this chapter, a two-level authentication scheme for communication in CRN is proposed. 
Authentication is a primary security property in wireless networks wherein the identity of a 
cognitive node is verified before providing access to available resources. Before joining the 
network, a CR node is validated by obtaining security credentials from an authorized point. 
Our proposed authentication scheme differs from other authentication schemes proposed in the 
literature in the following aspects: 
• It is a two-level authentication, wherein the authentication process is done by two different 
entities (fusion center (FC) and cluster head (CH) defined earlier in Section 1.5) 
consecutively, and the joining node can gain access to the network resources only after it 
has been verified by both the entities. 
• It utilizes the advantages of public and symmetric key cryptography approaches to encrypt 
messages sent between the joining node and the authenticating entities (both FC and CH), 
while other schemes apply the digital signature-based approach, which requires 
synchronization and periodic broadcasting that takes a longer execution time.  
• It authenticates the spectrum usage and the joining node in addition to the user. Other 
authentication schemes focused more on authenticating the spectrum usage and/or the 
joining node; however, the user of the joining node needs also to be authenticated to ensure 
whether it is a legitimate user. 
• The authentication process in our proposed scheme is carried over different layers (physical, 
data link, network, and application), while other authentication schemes are done on the 
physical and data link layers only. Authentication on different layers strengthens the 
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authentication process.  
• It mitigates different attacks that target the different layers such as the reflection attack, the 
denial of service attack, and the man-in-the-middle attack, which can occur after the 
spectrum sensing phase is done. While other authentication schemes focus more on 
mitigating the Primary User Emulation (PUE) attack only that takes place during the 
spectrum sensing phase. 
• It is specific to CRNs, as an attacker (adversary SU) may emulate a primary user’s signal to 
lure other secondary users. Therefore, a secure authentication algorithm is needed that can 
determine if a signal sent over the network is a primary user’s signal or an attacker’s signal. 
A unique challenge in addressing this problem is that the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) prohibits authentication or any modification to primary users after they 
buy the spectrum license. Consequently, existing cryptographic techniques cannot be used 
directly. 
The importance of having a two-level authentication scheme in CRNs stems from the need to 
reduce the opportunity for any adversary node to target the network and its nodes. In two-level 
authentication mechanism, the identity of the joining node is validated at two phases. In the first 
phase (at the FC level), the joining node is authenticated based on information that it already has, 
while in the second phase (at the CH level), it is authenticated based on information that is assigned 
to the joining node during the first phase. The information used in the first-level of authentication 
is stored on the device of the joining node and can be stolen and copied by the attacker, and 
therefore the attacker can successfully impersonate the joining node without actually stealing any 
physical device. On the other hand, the information needed in the second-level of authentication, 
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which is sent to the node in the first-level of authentication, cannot be copied by the attacker unless 
it actually steals the node’s physical device.  
The two-level authentication mechanism uses multiple biometric factors, which therefore gives 
higher levels of security in the network as people with malicious intents have to pull off two 
different types of theft to obtain all information before attempting to spoof the network.  
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 3.1, the authentication process is described by 
developing a model that is implemented on two different levels. In Section 3.2, the performance 
of the proposed approach is measured and compared with other approaches in the literature. Next, 
the mechanism is validated through two different formal validation techniques in Section 3.3. After 
that in Section 3.4, the proposed approach is analyzed informally from different security 
perspectives. The chapter is concluded with a summary in Section 3.5. 
3.1 The Mechanism 
3.1.1 Mechanism Description  
In this section, our two-level secure authentication scheme is explained. It is based on 
public and symmetric key cryptography, which reduces the number of cryptographic 
operations and the authentication time needed to complete the authentication process. 
The proposed authentication scheme aims to authenticate the node (device) and its user as 
well as the spectrum usage. It works at two different levels which are FC’s level and CH’s 
level. The joining node has to correctly pass over the proposed two levels of authentication 
in order to be admitted as a part of the CRN. The message sequence of the proposed 
authentication scheme is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: The Sequence Diagram of the Proposed Scheme. 
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We define the terms that will be used in our proposed authentication model as follows: 
• 𝑋: represents one of the system entities which are FC, CH, or SU. 
• 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑆: a certificate authority that generate and validate certificates of nodes. 
• 𝑃𝐾𝑋: the public key of entity X. 
• 𝐼𝐷𝑋: the logical identifier of entity X. 
• 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑆𝑈: the hardware address of SU. 
• 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡. (𝑆𝑈): the manufacturing certificate of entity SU, which contains 𝐼𝐷𝑋, 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑆𝑈, 
and 𝑃𝐾𝑆𝑈. It is generated and validated by the certificate authority, Server S. 
• 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡. (𝐹𝐶): the manufacturing certificate of entity FC, which contains 𝐼𝐷𝐹𝐶, 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐹𝐶 , 
and 𝑃𝐾𝐹𝐶. It is generated and validated by the certificate authority, Server S. 
• 𝐸𝑁𝐶(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜. ): all information is encrypted before sending it. 
• 𝑅: a random number (nonce) generated by the sender and sent with each message to 
track the messages and to correlate with their response messages.  
• 𝐶𝐼𝐷: the connection ID. 
• Symmetric Key (𝑆𝐾): a key used for encryption and decryption by the communicating 
nodes (FC, SU, and CH), 𝑆𝐾1 between FC and SU, 𝑆𝐾2 between SU and CH. 
• Joining Code:  generated by the FC. The joining code is unique within the cluster and 
is known by the nodes of the cluster. This joining code will be used to determine if this 
joining node is known to other cluster nodes. 
• Security Capabilities: features or the properties that a node supports to make a secure 
communication with other nodes such as encryption/decryption protocol, message 
integrity code and key management cryptography algorithm. 
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• Belief Level (BL): describes the level of reliability of a node to participate in spectrum 
sensing and data transmission over the network. 
After users’ certificates have been validated through the certificate authority, server S, all 
messages exchanged between the FC/CH and the joining node cannot be accessed by a 
listening adversary as the receiving node can easily determine if the received message was 
sent from an intruder or not, based on the node’s ID and its public key. 
During the authentication process, the authenticating node (i.e. FC or CH) asks the joining 
node up to three different questions as shown in Table 3.1. Answering these questions 
correctly by the joining node leads to successful authentication of this joining node. During 
the first level of authentication, the FC asks the joining node Question 1 (𝑄1) and Question 
2 (𝑄2) to check its ID and what information this node has about the joining cluster. If the 
joining node is a returning node to the same cluster, it has to answer the two questions 
correctly.  
TABLE 3.1 QUESTIONS TO THE JOINING NODE 
Question Joining Node Status Asked by 
𝑄1 What is your ID? and What is(are) the 
cluster(s) ID that you want to join? 
New or Returning FC & CH 
𝑄2 What is the joining code of the 
cluster(s) that you want to join? 
Returning FC & CH 
𝑄3 What is your IP? and What is your BL? New or Returning CH 
 
 However, if the node is a returning node, but to a different cluster or the node is completely 
a new node, it answers 𝑄1 only. The FC keeps track of all joined nodes by storing their 
MAC address in a database that is used to determine if a joining node is a new node or a 
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returning node. During the second level of authentication, the CH asks the joining node all 
the three questions as it should have the answers to all these questions as long as it has 
correctly passed the FC’s level of authentication. 
3.1.2 Authentication at FC level 
The FC’s authentication level starts by validating the nodes’ certificates, which are 
generated and assigned by Server S. In this process, the certificates of the joining node and 
the authenticating node are validated through the certificate authority, Server S.  During 
the certificate validation, the joining node (SU) sends its certificate (𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡. (𝑆𝑈) to the FC, 
which contacts the Server S to validate SU’s certificate. Once the SU’s certificate is 
validated, FC replies to SU by sending its own certificate (𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡. (𝐹𝐶)). Then, SU contacts 
the Server S to validate the certificate of FC. If it is validated, SU sends a 
message (𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑃𝐾𝐹𝐶(( ), encrypted with 𝑃𝐾𝐹𝐶, that contains its ID (𝐼𝐷𝑆𝑈), its security 
capabilities, a random number (nonce) 𝑅𝑆𝑈, a connection ID (𝐶𝐼𝐷), and its MAC address. 
MAC address is used because it is unique for each node at the authentication layer. The FC 
sends a message (𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑃𝐾𝑆𝑈 ()), encrypted with 𝑃𝐾𝑆𝑈, to the joining SU, which contains its 
ID (𝐼𝐷𝐹𝐶), symmetric key 𝑆𝐾1  used to encrypt/decrypt the messages exchanged from now 
on, a random nonce (𝑅𝐹𝐶) connected with the received 𝑅𝑆𝑈, and questions (𝑄1 and 𝑄2). The 
purpose of these questions is to ensure that this joining node has enough information about 
the cluster(s) that it wants to join.  
If the joining node is a new node or a returning node to a different cluster, 𝑄1 will be 
answered only by sending 𝐴𝑁𝑆1, which includes its ID (𝐼𝐷𝑆𝑈) and all cluster(s) ID(s) that 
SU receives from nodes which are within its range. However, if the joining node is a 
returning node to the same cluster that it was part of during the last connection time, it 
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answers both 𝑄1 and 𝑄2 by sending 𝐴𝑁𝑆1 and 𝐴𝑁𝑆2. If a returning node to the same cluster 
fails to provide the FC with the joining code, it will not be admitted. The joining SU replies 
to 𝑄1 and 𝑄2 by sending 𝐴𝑁𝑆1 and 𝐴𝑁𝑆2 encrypted with the symmetric key 𝑆𝐾1. Upon the 
success of answering 𝑄1 and 𝑄2 (if applicable), the resource negotiation phase starts in 
which the joining SU sends its QoS requirements to the FC. The FC takes the responsibility 
to determine if the desired cluster can provide them or not. 
The negotiation phase ends with either an agreement or a disagreement between the joining 
SU and the FC. If both do not agree on resources, SU will not be joined. If both of them 
agree on resources, the FC assigns an IP address to this node, provides it with the cluster 
joining code, calculates a value called belief level, and prepares the public key of CH. The 
belief level describes the level of reliability of this node to participate in data transmission 
over the network. The public key of CH, 𝑃𝐾𝐶𝐻, is used in the second level of 
authentication. The node’s IP address, the node’s belief level, the cluster head’s public key, 
and the cluster’s joining code are encrypted in one message and sent to the joining node. 
Meanwhile, the FC sends the node’s MAC address, the node’s belief level, and the node’s 
public key 𝑃𝐾𝑆𝑈 to the CH. These parameters are sent in an encrypted message as FC and 
CH communicate over a secure control channel. Figure 3.2 illustrates the flow chart of the 




Figure 3.2: Flow Chart for Authentication at FC Level. 
3.1.3 Authentication at CH level 
The joining SU starts the second level of authentication by sending a message 
(𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑃𝐾𝐶𝐻( )), encrypted with the already known CH’s public key, to the cluster head. This 
encrypted message contains the joining node’s public key 𝑃𝐾𝑆𝑈, its MAC address, and a 
random number 𝑅𝑆𝑈. The CH now wants to authenticate the user of this joining node by 
asking three questions. First, the CH sends (𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑃𝐾𝑆𝑈( )), an encrypted message with the 
joining node’s public key. In this message, the CH asks the joining SU about its IP and 
about the cluster ID, and sends the symmetric key, 𝑆𝐾2, that will be used to encrypt/decrypt 




If the joining SU answers correctly, the CH sends an encrypted message with the 𝑆𝐾2 
asking the joining SU 𝑄2 about the cluster’s joining code and 𝑄3 about its BL. The joining 
SU replies by sending its answers (𝐴𝑁𝑆1 and 𝐴𝑁𝑆2) encrypted with 𝑆𝐾2. If the joining SU 
answers correctly, the CH admits the joining SU to be part of the cluster. The SU can now 
join the cluster and can start transmitting data with the other cluster nodes. If the joining 
node fails to answer any of these three questions, it will not be admitted and the CH sends 
a report to the FC. Figure 3.3 illustrates the flow chart of the CH level authentication. Each 
message sent between the joining node and the authenticating node contains their random 
(nonce) numbers, which are used to synchronize messages and to prevent any intruder from 
eavesdropping on the messages exchanged between the communicating nodes.  On the 
other hand, each node’s IP is sent encrypted once the node sends its first message to the 
other communicating party. The message receiver validates the sender’s IP by extracting 
the sender’s IP from the message sent earlier by FC to CH, and compares it with the 
received one. This validation prevents the messages exchanged between the 






Figure 3.3: Flow Chart for Authentication at CH Level. 
3.2 Performance Evaluation 
3.2.1 Complexity Analysis 
We analyze the performance overhead of our proposed authentication algorithm. Our 
algorithm has two stages (at the FC or CH levels), five steps/each. In each stage, the joining 
node and the authenticating party exchange their first message using the other node’s public 
key (two messages), and the other messages are sent encrypted using the symmetric key. 
By analyzing those messages, we find that the authenticating party (FC or CH) sends two 
messages, and the joining node sends three messages. As each joining node SUi encodes 
three messages and decodes two messages, each joining node performs 5 ∗ 𝑂(1) messages’ 
encoding and decoding. Thus, the computation overhead for each node is ≈ 𝑂(1). On the 
other hand, the authenticating party encodes 2 ∗ |𝑀| and decodes 3 ∗ |M| messages, where 
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M represents the total number of SUs. Therefore, the computation overhead at the 
authenticating party is (2 ∗ |𝑀| + 3 ∗ |𝑀|). If we replace M by N for complexity 
calculation standards, the computation overhead for the authenticating party is ≈ 𝑂(𝑁).  
The communication overhead is calculated based on the number of messages exchanged 
between the joining node and the authenticating party. The number of messages is equal to 
that used in the computation overhead; therefore, the communication overhead at the 
joining SU is ≈ 𝑂(1) and at the authenticating party is ≈ 𝑂(𝑁). 
3.2.2 Numerical Results 
In this section, we compare our proposed authentication scheme with the approaches 
described in [26-27]. The comparison is in terms of the number of cryptographic operations 
needed by each technique and the total authentication time. We use the benchmarks 
available in [74] where C++ is used to implement the cryptographic algorithms, and 
Microsoft Visual C++ 2005 SP1 is the compiler and the system specifications are an Intel 
Core 2 1.83 GHz processor under Windows Vista in 32-bit mode. We select a 
cryptographic algorithm for each cryptographic operation as in Table 3.2. 
By analyzing the authentication techniques proposed in [26], and in [27] and our proposed 
scheme using the benchmarks in [74], we can determine how many times each 
cryptographic operation is executed in total, as shown in Table 3.3. Moreover, we use the 
values in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 to compute the time needed to complete the 





TABLE 3.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS 
Cryptographic Operation Cryptographic Algorithm Execution Time 
Digital Signature Generation  RSA 1024 1.48ms 
Digital Signature Verification RSA 1024 0.07ms 
Certificate Validation RSA 1024 0.07ms 
Message Encryption with Public 
Key 
RSA 1024 0.08ms 
Message Encryption with 
Symmetric Key 
AES/EAX 1.8µs 
Message Decryption with Public 
Key 
RSA 1024 1.46ms 
Message Decryption with 
Symmetric Key 
AES/EAX 1.8µs 
Hash Function HMAC(SHA-1) 0.509µs 
 
TABLE 3.3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION COUNT 
Cryptographic Operation Scheme 













Certificate Validation 5 0.35m 4 0.28m 2 0.14m 
Hash Function 2 1.02µ 13 6.62µ 2 1.02µ 
Message Encryption with Public 
Key 
7 0.56m 4 0.32m 4 0.32m 
Message Encryption with 
Symmetric Key 
0 0 6 10.8µ 6 10.8µ 
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Message Decryption with Public 
key 
7 10.22m 4 5.84m 4 5.84m 
Message Decryption with 
Symmetric Key 
0 0 6 10.8µ 6 10.8µ 
Digital Signature Generation 4 5.92m 1 1.48m 0 0 
Digital Signature Verification 4 0.28m 1 0.28m 0 0 
Total 29 17.3m 39 8.2m 24 6.3m 
 
To complete the authentication scheme proposed in [26] and in [27], twenty-nine and 
thirty-nine cryptographic operations have to be executed, respectively. However, in our 
proposed scheme only twenty-four operations are required, which means more than 10% 
less computation and calculation cost. 
We next analyze the time needed to complete the authentication process, which is referred 
to as the authentication delay. It consists of two parts, the processing time and the 
transmission time. The processing time is the major part, which represents the time needed 
to execute the cryptographic operations. The transmission time is the time needed to 
transmit each message between the authenticating node and the joining node. It was 
assumed that the transmission time has the same value in all the schemes, therefore we 
neglect the transmission time in the calculation of authentication delay. 
According to [74], the signature generation time is 1.48ms, the verification time using RSA 
1024 is 0.07ms, the time for the message encryption with public key is 0.08ms, the time 
for the message decryption with public key is 1.46ms, the time for the message encryption 
with symmetric key is 1.8µs, the time for the message decryption with symmetric key is 
1.8µs, and the hashing time using HMAC (SHA-1) is 0.509µs. The authentication time in 
[26] was 17.3ms and in [27] is equal to 8.2ms. It is approximately 6.32ms in our 
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authentication scheme, which is about 63% and 23% faster in comparison to that in [26] 
and [27], respectively. It is evident that our proposed scheme reduces the authentication 
time. Moreover, our proposed approach is less complex in comparison to that of [26] and 
[27]’s; since, the symmetric key cryptography is used for encrypting and decrypting most 
of the messages exchanged. The symmetric key cryptography has less memory occupation, 
less memory use, and less power utilization. 
3.3 Mechanism Validation 
We verify the correctness of our proposed authentication scheme by using two different formal 
verification methods which are BAN logic [75] and Scyther verification tool [76].  
3.3.1 Verification through BAN logic 
In BAN logic, all messages sent between two communicating nodes are formulated according 
to the BAN logic format and then BAN logic axioms and messages’ analysis are applied to these 
messages to conclude if the protocol meets its desired objectives or not. 
We define the terms used through the verification process of our proposed authentication 
algorithm as follows: 
• SU, FC, and CH: are the network agents. 
• S: is a certificate authority known to all network nodes. 
• (Info.): is the message encrypted. 
• PKFC: is the public key of entity FC. 
• PKSU: is the public key of entity SU. 
• PKCH: is the public key of entity CH. 




• IDFC: is the logical identifier of entity FC. 
• IDSU: is the logical identifier of entity SU. 
• IDCH: is the logical identifier of entity CH. 
• RFC: is a random number (nonce) generated by FC. 
• RSU: is a random number (nonce) generated by SU. 
• SU 
SK1
⇔  FC: is the symmetric key that SU and FC agree during the FC level authentication. 
• SU 
SK2
⇔  CH: is the symmetric key that SU and CH agree during the CH level authentication. 
In BAN logic, there are two network agents (P and Q), a message (X) is exchanged between the 
network agents. Message (X) is encrypted by an encryption key (K). The axioms definitions and 
their implications are below: 
• 𝑃 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑋 : 𝑃 acts as if 𝑋 is true, and may assert 𝑋 in other messages. 
• 𝑃 said 𝑋: At one time, 𝑃 transmitted and believed message 𝑋, although 𝑃 might no 
longer believe 𝑋. 
• 𝑃 sees 𝑋 : 𝑃 receives message 𝑋, and can read and repeat of 𝑋. 
• 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ(𝑋): 𝑋 has not previously been sent in any message. 
Authentication at FC Level 
We start with defining the assumptions: 
𝑆𝑈 believes 
𝑃𝐾𝑆𝑈
→   𝑆𝑈, 
                         𝐹𝐶 believes 
𝑃𝐾𝐹𝐶
→   𝐹𝐶, 
                         𝑆𝑈 believes
𝑃𝐾𝑆
→  𝑆, 
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                         𝐹𝐶  believes 
𝑃𝐾𝑆
→  𝑆, 
                        𝑆𝑈 believes fresh (RSU),     
                        𝐹𝐶 believes fresh (RFC), 
 𝑆𝑈 believes 𝐹𝐶 controls (𝑆𝑈
𝑆𝐾1
⇔  𝐹𝐶), 
𝐹𝐶 believes 𝐹𝐶 controls  (𝑆𝑈 
𝑆𝐾1
⇔  𝐹𝐶). 
 
We can represent the goals of the FC level authentication (what we want to prove) according to 







Here are the idealized messages of the FC’s level authentication, note that we omit the messages 
and the parts of messages which do not affect the sender and receiver identities. 
MSG1: FC → SU: ENCPKS(MACFC,
PKFC
→   FC). 
MSG2: SU → FC: ENCPKS (MACSU,
PKSU
→   SU), 
                                ENCPKFC(IDSU, RSU, MACSU) .  
MSG3: FC → SU:   ENCPKSU (IDFC, RSU, RFC, Q1, Q2, SU
  SK1
⇔  FC). 
MSG4: SU → FC: ENCSK1(RFC, ANS1, ANS2).  
We apply the axioms of BAN logic on each message. 
 
On message 1: 
𝑆𝑈 sees (MACFC,
𝑃𝐾𝐹𝐶
→   𝐹𝐶) and 𝑆𝑈 believes 
𝑃𝐾𝑆
→  𝑆, therefore 𝑆𝑈 believes 𝑆 said(MACFC,
𝑃𝐾𝐹𝐶
→   𝐹𝐶). 
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 So, 𝑆𝑈 believes 𝑆 believes (MACFC,
𝑃𝐾𝐹𝐶
→   𝐹𝐶), which means 𝑆𝑈 believes 𝑆 controls (MACFC,
𝑃𝐾𝐹𝐶
→   𝐹𝐶), which results in 𝑆𝑈 believes (MACFC,
𝑃𝐾𝐹𝐶
→   𝐹𝐶). 
For simplicity, we consider the part that is related to the public key 
cryptography, hence 𝑆𝑈 believes 
𝑃𝐾𝐹𝐶
→   𝐹𝐶. 
On message 2: 
We start by considering the first part of message 2, which is ENC𝑃𝐾𝑆 (MACSU,
PKSU
→   SU). 
𝐹𝐶 sees (MACSU,
𝑃𝐾𝑆𝑈
→   𝑆𝑈) and  𝐹𝐶 believes 
𝑃𝐾𝑆
→  𝑆, therefore 𝐹𝐶 believes 𝑆 said (MACSU,
𝑃𝐾𝑆𝑈
→   𝑆𝑈). 
 So, 𝐹𝐶 believes 𝑆 believes (MACSU,
𝑃𝐾𝑆𝑈
→   𝑆𝑈),   which means 𝐹𝐶 believes 𝑆 controls (MACSU,
𝑃𝐾𝑆𝑈
→   𝑆𝑈),  which results in 𝐹𝐶 believes (MACSU,
𝑃𝐾𝑆𝑈
→   𝑆𝑈). 
For simplicity, we consider the part that is related to the public key cryptography, 
hence 𝐹𝐶 believes 
𝑃𝐾𝑆𝑈
→   𝑆𝑈. 
We next consider the second part of message 2, which is  ENCPKFC(IDSU, RSU, MACSU).  The only 
deduction that we obtain is 𝐹𝐶 sees (IDSU, RSU, MACSU). 
On message 3: 
𝑆𝑈 sees (IDFC, RSU, RFC, Q1, Q2, SU
  SK1
⇔  FC), but 𝑆𝑈 believes fresh (RSU), 
therefore 𝑆𝑈 believes fresh (IDFC, RSU, RFC, Q1, Q2, SU
  SK1
⇔  FC). 𝑆𝑈 believes
𝑃𝐾𝐹𝐶
→   𝐹𝐶, 
 and 𝑆𝑈 sees (IDFC, RSU, RFC, Q1, Q2, SU
  SK1
⇔  FC), 
therefore𝑆𝑈 believes 𝐹𝐶 said (IDFC, RSU, RFC, Q1, Q2, SU
  SK1
⇔  FC).   With the previous 
derivation we conclude that S𝑈 believes 𝐹𝐶 believes (IDFC, RSU, RFC, Q1, Q2, SU
  SK1
⇔  FC), and 
with the assumption  𝑆𝑈 believes 𝐹𝐶 controls (𝑆𝑈 
𝑆𝐾1
⇔  𝐹𝐶), we find that  
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𝑆𝑈 believes (IDFC, RSU, RFC, Q1, Q2, SU
  SK1
⇔  FC), 
which means 𝑆𝑈 believes (𝑆𝑈 
𝑆𝐾1
⇔  𝐹𝐶).                             (a) 
On message 4: 
𝐹𝐶 sees (RFC, ANS1, ANS2) and then compares the received RFC with the sent RFC. If both are 
equal, it means FC ensures that SU has received 𝑆𝐾1. 
Therefore, 𝐹𝐶 believes 𝑆𝑈 believes (𝑆𝑈 
𝑆𝐾1
⇔  𝐹𝐶), and with the assumption 
𝐹𝐶 believes 𝐹𝐶 controls  (𝑆𝑈 
𝑆𝐾1
⇔  𝐹𝐶),  we find that 𝐹𝐶 believes (𝑆𝑈 
𝑆𝐾1
⇔  𝐹𝐶).                 (b) 
Derivations (a) and (b) are the objectives of our proposed authentication scheme on the FC’s 
level. 
Authentication at CH Level 
The authentication on the CH’s level aims to validate the identity of the SU, i.e. the CH ensures 
that the user of the CR node is a legitimate user already authenticated by the FC and has received 
the information needed. This authentication level follows the question and answer method wherein 
the CH asks the SU for some information and the SU replies with the answers. Failing in answering 
any of these questions results in not accepting the node in the network and a report will be sent to 
FC. 
We start with the assumptions: 
                𝑆𝑈 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑠 
𝑃𝐾𝑆𝑈
→   𝑆𝑈,    
               𝐶𝐻 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑠 
𝑃𝐾𝐶𝐻
→   𝐶𝐻,       
                  𝑆𝑈 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑠 
𝑃𝐾𝐶𝐻
→   𝐶𝐻,     
                 𝑆𝑈 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ (𝑅𝑆𝑈), 
               𝐶𝐻 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ (𝑅𝐶𝐻), 
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                 𝑆𝑈 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝐶𝐻 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 (𝑆𝑈 
𝑆𝐾2
⇔  𝐶𝐻), 
              𝐶𝐻 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝐶𝐻 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠  (𝑆𝑈 
𝑆𝐾2
⇔  𝐶𝐻). 
According to BAN logic the goals of the CH authentication level (what we want to prove) are:  
               𝑆𝑈 believes 𝑆𝑈
𝑆𝐾2
⇔ 𝐶𝐻, 
 𝐶𝐻 believes 𝐶𝐻
𝑆𝐾2
⇔ 𝑆𝑈. 
The messages exchanged between the CH and the SU are: 
MSG1: SU → CH: ENCPKCH(IPSU, RSU, MACSU).  
MSG2: CH → SU: ENCPKSU (IDCH, RSU, RCH, Q1 , SU
SK2
⇔  CH).  
MSG3: SU → CH: ENCSK2(RCH, RSU, ANS1).  
MSG4: CH → SU: ENCSK2(RSU, RCH, Q2, Q3). 
MSG5: SU → CH: ENCSK2(RCH, RSU, ANS2, ANS3).  
Note that CH encrypts question 1 in message 2 by the public key of SU while question 2 and 
question 3 in messages 4 and 6 are encrypted with the symmetric key SK2 upon the key agreement 
between the CH and SU that occurs in message 3. Therefore, to verify the correctness of this 
authentication level, we need to apply BAN logic to the first three messages only. 
On message 1: 
CH compares 
PKSU
→   SU with the one received from the FC, and if they are same, CH concludes 
that 𝐶𝐻 believes 
𝑃𝐾𝑆𝑈
→   𝑆𝑈. 
 
On message 2: 
𝑆𝑈 sees (IDCH, RSU, RCH, Q1, SU
SK2
⇔  CH),  
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but 𝑆𝑈 believes fresh (RSU), therefore 𝑆𝑈 believes fresh (IDCH, RSU, RCH, Q1, SU
SK2
⇔  CH). 
𝑆𝑈 believes 
𝑃𝐾𝐶𝐻
→   𝐶𝐻  and 𝑆𝑈 sees (IDCH, RSU, RCH, Q1 , SU
SK2
⇔  CH), 
therefore 𝑆𝑈 believes 𝐶𝐻 said (IDCH, RSU, RCH, Q1, SU
SK2
⇔  CH). 
 With the previous derivation we conclude that 
 𝑆𝑈 believes 𝐶𝐻 believes (IDCH, RSU, RCH, Q1, SU
SK2
⇔  CH), and with the assumption  
𝑆𝑈 believes 𝐶𝐻 controls (𝑆𝑈 
𝑆𝐾2
⇔  𝐶𝐻),  
we find that 𝑆𝑈 believes (IDCH, RSU, RCH, Q1, SU
SK2
⇔  CH),  
which means 𝑆𝑈 believes (𝑆𝑈 
𝑆𝐾2
⇔  𝐶𝐻).                                (c) 
 
On message 3: 
𝐶𝐻 sees (RCH, RSU, ANS1) and compares the received RCH with the sent RCH. If both are equal, 
CH ensures that SU has received 𝑆𝐾2. 
Therefore, 𝐶𝐻 believes 𝑆𝑈 believes(𝑆𝑈 
𝑆𝐾2
⇔  𝐶𝐻), and with the assumption 
𝐶𝐻 believes 𝐶𝐻 controls  (𝑆𝑈 
𝑆𝐾2
⇔  𝐶𝐻), we find that 𝐶𝐻 believes (𝑆𝑈 
𝑆𝐾2
⇔  𝐶𝐻).         (d) 
Derivations (c) and (d) are the objectives of our proposed authentication scheme on the CH’s 
level. 
3.3.2  Verification through Scyther  
We verified the vulnerability of the proposed authentication mechanism to potential well-known 
attacks such as reflection attack, man-in-the-middle attack and denial of service (DoS) attack, by 
using the Scyther verification tool [76]. We set up the verification environment by using the 
following settings parameters shown in Table 3.4. We then, described the algorithm messages sent 
between the two entities, the joining node and the authenticating party (FC and CH). After the 
verification run has completed, a “no attacks” messaged popped up as show in Figures 3.4 and 3.5. 
It shows that our protocol is safe against the multiple attacks mentioned earlier, as “no attacks” 
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break the verification process. Moreover, the “status of each message is “OK, verified”, which 
means that each message has been received correctly by the destination with no alteration (i.e. 
same at it has been sent by the source). These attacks are analyzed in the following section and we 
show how they are eliminated through our authentication mechanism. 
TABLE 3.4 VERIFICATION ENVIRONMENT PARAMETERS 
Parameter Value 
Maximum Number of Runs  1000 
Matching Type Find all type flaws 
Search Running Find all attacks 






Figure 3.4: The Results of Executing the Proposed Authentication Mechanism at FC Level in 
Scyther Environment. 




Figure 3.5: The Results of Executing the Proposed Authentication Mechanism at CH Level in 





3.4 Security Analysis 
We formally validated the authentication mechanism through two different formal verification 
techniques. We now discuss the proposed authentication scheme informally, in terms of its ability 
to fulfil security requirements and prevent multiple attacks. The proposed scheme is a secure 
scheme as long as it disallows any adversary node from accessing the network. In this section, we 
show the security properties (requirements) that our two-level authentication scheme fulfills. 
Moreover, we show the attacks that are prevented by our authentication scheme. 
3.4.1 Authentication  
As mentioned above, authentication is one of the security requirements that a secure network 
has to fulfill. Our proposed authentication scheme ensures that a node cannot get access to network 
resources until it gets authenticated. Moreover, applying a two level of authentication strengthens 
the authentication process and reduces or even cancels the opportunity for a malicious node to 
cheat the FC or the CH. 
3.4.2 Resource Availability and Accessibility  
In the proposed scheme, network resources are only allocated to authenticated nodes. Nodes 
that are not authenticated are not allowed to access the resources; therefore, the resources are 
available for authenticated nodes only. This enhances the network security and network 
performance. 
3.4.3 Reflection Attack 
It is an attack that targets any challenge-response authentication scheme wherein the attacker 
contacts a third party to get a response to the authenticating node’s challenge. By our proposed 
authentication scheme, random numbers (nonce) are generated as a challenge to the joining node 
that has to send its identifier with the received nonce, as well as its own random number encrypted 
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by its private key. The FC or the CH, whichever is the authenticator, decrypts this message and 
checks the random nonce number of the joining node. If they do not match, the reflection attack is 
detected and prevented. Therefore, the reflection attack cannot be launched with our authentication 
scheme. 
3.4.4 Man-in-the-Middle Attack 
In this attack, a malicious node accesses or invades communication between two parties. It 
impersonates both parties and gains access to information that the two parties were trying to send 
to each other. It allows a malicious actor to intercept, send and receive data meant for someone 
else, or not meant to be sent at all, without either outside party knowing until the action is complete. 
By our proposed authentication scheme, all messages exchanged between the joining node and the 
authenticator (FC or CH) are encrypted by the receiver’s public key or the symmetric key, which 
ensures that the only one that can decrypt and understand the entire message is the one that has the 
corresponding private key or the symmetric key. Therefore, this attack can be easily detected and 
mitigated by our proposed authentication scheme.  
3.4.5 Denial of Service Attack 
A malicious node may eavesdrop on the communication between two nodes and drop the 
messages exchanged between the communicating nodes in order to reduce the network 
performance. Another example of DoS attack is that a malicious node may inject the network with 
meaningless messages, which influence other nodes’ performance. By our proposed 
authentication, the FC accepts authentication requests from nodes that are already predefined in a 
manufacture. If a node that belongs to this list launches the DoS attack, the FC will receive multiple 
requests from this node in order to flood the network. Therefore, the FC quickly and effectively 
identifies incoming traffic as malicious. Once the flood of traffic is identified as a DoS attack, an 
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effective response is taken to absorb the attack, until the source is identified and blocked. This 
response contains releasing the assigned channels, setting its belief level value to zero and 
notifying the cluster heads about this node in order to prevent any node from communicating with 
this malicious node. 
3.5 Summary 
Cognitive radio is considered as a promising technology to solve the spectrum scarcity problem. 
The CR nodes are more exposed to security vulnerabilities and threats because of their wireless 
nature. Secure communication is one of the challenging tasks in CRNs. A CR node cannot access 
the spectrum unless it has been authenticated by a reliable node. In this chapter, we propose a two-
level secure authentication scheme in CRN wherein the authenticating node and the joining node 
accept a key agreement. We use the advantages of the public-key and the symmetric-key 
cryptography to secure the messages exchanged between the communicating nodes. During the 
authentication process and after a symmetric key is shared between the communicating nodes, any 
communication would be carried out using the symmetric key cryptography. 
The proposed authentication scheme, in comparison to the existing approaches, reduces the 
number of cryptographic operations and the authentication time needed to complete the 
authentication process. Moreover, the correctness of the proposed approach has been verified using 
the BAN logic and through the Scyther verification tool. We showed that our authentication 





4. Chapter 4:  Monitoring Nodes Behavior during 
Spectrum Sensing Mechanism  
In this chapter, we propose a novel collaborative approach during spectrum sensing process that 
monitors the behavior of sensing nodes and identifies the malicious and misbehaving sensing 
nodes. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first effort that focuses on addressing the 
attacker behavior rather than the attack itself. By monitoring the sensing nodes behavior, multiple 
passive and active attacks can be mitigated. The proposed approach measures the node’s sensing 
reliability through a value called belief level, which is assigned to each communicating node 
during the authentication process (Chapter 3). 
The main contributions in this chapter can be summarized as following: 
• To the best of our knowledge, it is the first work in CRNs security that focuses on 
addressing the adversary nodes’ behaviors more than addressing the attacks themselves. 
By doing so: 
o It mitigates multiple attacks other than just PUEA and SSDF attacks, such as DoS, 
collusion, and objective function attacks. 
o It works as a reactive approach to active attacks and as a proactive approach to 
passive attacks. 
o In increases the probability of detecting adversary nodes, which therefore improves 
the spectrum utilization.  
• It increases the probability of detecting vacant spectrum channels and it also decreases the 
false alarm probability.  
• It secures the sensing-reputation reports exchanged between the different sensing nodes by 




This chapter is organized as follows: firstly, the system requirements and the general 
assumptions are shown in Section 4.1. Then, the description of the threat model that we are 
addressing is described in Section 4.2. Next in Section 4.3, the proposed approach for 
monitoring nodes’ behavior is described. After that in Section 4.4, the performance of the 
proposed approach is measured and compared with other approaches in the literature. Next in 
Section 4.5, the proposed approach is validated informally from different security perspectives. 
The chapter is concluded with a summary in Section 4.6. 
4.1 System Requirements and General Assumptions 
The system used in the proposed approach is the same one shown in Figure 1.3 of Chapter 1. 
Each sensing node is assigned a value called belief level (BL), which describes the accuracy and 
reliability of the sensing nodes that participate in making the final sensing decision. The belief 
level of each node is the key element of the proposed approach as it will be used to correctly 
monitor the sensing nodes’ behavior and detect the adversary nodes during the spectrum sensing 
phase. We assume four categories of trust and the BL has a range of [0-4] based on these categories 
of trust as following: 
              0 ≤ BL ≤ 1: Very_Untrusted 
   1 < BL < 2:Untrusted 
2 ≤ BL < 3: Trusted  
          3 ≤ BL ≤ 4: Very_Trusted 




In each cluster, one node is chosen by the FC as a cluster head (CH) that has the highest 
BL. At the time of cluster formation any node is randomly chosen as a CH as all the nodes have 
the same initial BL value. The cluster heads are not fixed all the time; whenever, a new node is 
added to a cluster and it has a higher BL than the current CH’s BL, the new node will be selected 
as a CH. The energy detection method is used by all SUs to detect the presence or absence of the 
PU in its spectrum band. The cooperative spectrum sensing is done as in [76], wherein all the 
cluster nodes sense the spectrum, make a decision about the PU presence/absence and forward 
their decision to other nodes. 
4.2 The Mechanism 
4.2.1 Preface 
The sequence diagram of the proposed approach is shown in Figure 4.1 that starts with 
exchanging nodes’ certificates. Each node’s certificate is validated by Server S. Upon the success 
of certificates’ validation, the joining node sends its ID and its security capabilities to the CH. The 
CH keeps track of the nodes IDs that participate in the sensing process. The CH then assigns 
symmetric keys to the sensing nodes. These symmetric keys will be used later for 
encrypting/decrypting the sensing-reputation reports. Next, the sensing nodes perform the sensing, 
monitor other nodes’ behavior, prepare the sensing-reputation reports and forward them to the CH 
(Section 4.3.2). These sensing-reputation reports are analyzed in each cluster by its CH to make 
the final decision about the spectrum availability and the sensing nodes behavior. The CH then 
forwards the final sensing decisions to its cluster nodes (Section 4.3.3). All cluster nodes are 





Figure 4.1: System Sequence Diagram. 
4.2.2 Monitoring Nodes Behavior 
All the clusters nodes perform the spectrum sensing process to find the vacant spectrum 
channels by using the energy detection technique wherein each sensing node measures the signal 
strengths in all PU’s channels, and by using the energy detection method SUs make the initial 
binary decision about the presence/absence of PU in its reserved channel(s). Each sensing SU uses 
the pre-known information about PUs signal (such as signal power threshold and modulation type) 
and compares it with the sensing signal in order to avoid PUEA. If the received signal does not 
match the expected signal (i.e. a malicious node emulates PU), the sensing SU broadcasts a 
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message to all cluster nodes notifying them and therefore PUEA is mitigated. However, if they 
match, it means a PU is present in its spectrum channels. If an SU does not receive any signal over 
the sensing channel, it decides that the spectrum is free and can be used. Each sensing node 
forwards its sensing decision(s) to its neighbors, compares their sensing results with its sensing 
results, prepares sensing-reputation reports about their neighboring node(s), and forwards these 
reports to the CH. 
In case PUEA is avoided as mentioned earlier, each sensing SU senses the spectrum and saves its 
sensing results in a parameter called the sensing result (SR). It has two values, either 0 for a free 
spectrum or 1 for an occupied spectrum by a real PU. The sensing SU forwards its SR to its 
neighboring nodes, which have their own SRs. Each sensing node compares its own SR with the 
received SR from its neighboring node and if they match with the received SR, the sensing node 
decides that its neighboring node is a “GOOD” node G; otherwise it is a “BAD” node B. The 
sensing node does the same for all its neighboring nodes. 
4.2.3 Analyzing Nodes Behavior 
Each node will keep monitoring the behavior of its neighboring nodes and keep sending periodic 
sensing-reputation reports to its CH about their sensing results and their neighboring nodes’ 
behavior. Sensing-reputation reports sent by each cluster node to its CH have the following format 
(Reporting Node ID (RG) || 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐺 || Reported Node ID (RD) || Opinion) where 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐺 is the sensing 
result of the reporting node and it is either 0 (i.e. “Free” spectrum) or 1 (i.e. “Occupied” spectrum) 
and Opinion is about the reported node (RD) and it is either 0 (i.e. “BAD” node) or 1 (i.e. “GOOD” 
node). Note that a reporting node is a reported node in its neighboring nodes’ sensing-reputation 
reports and a reported node is a reporting node in its own sensing-reputation report. CH is a 
trustworthy node since its BL is the highest in the trusted range and it is the only node that can 
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check the correctness of the periodic sensing-reputation reports. Upon the reception of the different 
sensing-reputation reports from the different cluster nodes, CH analyzes these reports by extracting 
the sensing result of the reporting nodes and their opinion about the reliability of the reported nodes 
to make the final decision about the spectrum availability and about the nodes behavior.  
The sensing-reputation reports analysis of making the final sensing decision, 𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷, is described 
in Algorithm 4.1. CH forms two groups of nodes, occupied group (OG) and free group (FG), where 
all the nodes in the same group have the same sensing decision “occupied” or “free”, respectively. 
CH analyzes the sensing-reputation reports received from the trusted nodes in each group only. A 
trusted node is a node that has its BL greater than or equal to a value called 𝐵𝐿𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑, which 
describes the lower limit of a BL for a node to be considered trusted.  
CH makes the final decision about the spectrum availability based on the reports sent by different 
nodes and their BL values and then forwards the final decision to its cluster nodes. A specific rule 
is applied to process these reports in order to make the final decision about the reported node. The 
general rule of K-out-of-N rule is where K users out of N users must have the same opinion in order 
to consider their opinion. In case 50% K-rule is used, K is equal to N/2.   
We propose a new K-rule, where K represents the number of votes and where we assign each user 
a different voting weight based on its BL value. We apply the following criteria in order to find 
the value of K:  
• A node’s decision with a BL value of  3 ≤ 𝐵𝐿 ≤ 4 counts as three votes. 
• A node’s decision with a BL value of 2.5 ≤ 𝐵𝐿 < 3 counts as two votes. 
• A node’s decision with a BL value of 2 ≤ 𝐵𝐿 < 2.5  counts as one vote. 
• A node’s decision with a BL value less than 2 does not count. 
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The total votes’ number of the nodes, which have the same sensing decision, has to fulfill the 50% 
K-rule (i.e. it has to be greater than or equal to a value called 𝑀𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑), which is equal to half 
the number of the cluster nodes.  
CH analyzes the sensing-reputation reports to determine the malicious and misbehaving reporting 
and reported nodes as following: 
If the reporting node reports “GOOD” about the reported node: 
• If (𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 == 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐺  && 𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 == 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷), then it is a true “GOOD” opinion both the 
reporting and the reported node are trusted nodes. 
• If (𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 ! = 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐺  && 𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 == 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷), then it is a true “GOOD” opinion  the reporting 
node is an adversary node that wants to falsify the sensing result (i.e.  the reporting node 
launches SSDF attack). 
• If (𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 == 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐺  && 𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 ! = 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷), then it is a false “GOOD” opinion  both the 
reporting and the reported node are adversary nodes. The reported node wants to falsify the 
sensing result (i.e. the reported node launches the SSDF); while the reporting node wants to 
send false report about the reported node (i.e. the reporting node launches Collusion attacks). 
• If (𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 ! = 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐺  && 𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 ! = 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷), then it is a false “GOOD” opinion  both the 
reporting and the reported node are adversary nodes (both the nodes launch the SSDF and the 
Collusion attacks). 
If the reporting node reports “BAD” about the reported node: 
• If (𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 == 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐺  && 𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 == 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷), then it is a false “BAD” opinion  the reporting 
node is an adversary node. The reporting node wants to send false report about the reported 
node (i.e. the reporting node launches Collusion attack). 
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• If (𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 ! = 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐺  && 𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 == 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷), then it is a false “BAD” opinion  the reporting node 
is an adversary node that wants to falsify the sensing result and wants to send false report about 
the reported node (i.e. the reporting node launches SSDF and Collusion attacks). 
• If (𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 == 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐺  && 𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 ! = 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷), then it is a true “BAD” opinion  the reported node 
is an adversary node that wants to falsify the sensing result (i.e. the reported node launches the 
SSDF attack). 
• If (𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 ! = 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐺  && 𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 ! = 𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷), then it is a false “BAD” opinion  both the reporting 
and the reported node are adversary nodes (both the nodes launch SSDF and Collusion attacks). 
In summary, each node is given a variable weight of votes based on its BL, and this variable votes’ 
weight affects the final sensing results decision. The nodes behavior is analyzed based on the final 
sensing results decision. Note that we assume the channels carrying the sensing-reputation reports 
are error-free and each sensing-reputation report has a timestamp associated to it. If CH does not 




ALGORITHM 4.1: FINAL DECISION OF SPECTRUM SENSING 
𝐈𝐧𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐳𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧  
𝑂𝐺: All reporting nodes including CH that have SR = 1 
𝐹𝐺: All reporting nodes including CH that have SR = 0 
𝐶:Number of SUs in a cluster 
𝐵𝐿𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑: Threshold value of the reporting node’s belief level 
𝑀𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑: Threshold value of the number of nodes that should have the same sensing decision and is equal to ⌈𝐶/2⌉ 
𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡: Votes count of reporting nodes that have SR = 1 and initialized to zero 
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡: Votes count of reporting nodes that have SR = 0 and initialized to zero 
𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷: Final sensing decision 
𝑆𝑅𝐶𝐻: The sensing decision of the CH 
𝑅𝐺: The reporting node 
𝐾𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒(𝐵𝐿𝑅𝐺𝑚): Function to calculate the votes count for each node 
𝐾: Total votes for all nodes and initialized to zero        
…………………………………………………………………….... 
 ∀ 𝑅𝐺𝑖 ∈ 𝑂𝐺 
      𝐼𝐹 (𝐵𝐿𝑅𝐺𝑖 ≥ 𝐵𝐿𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑) 
             𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡+= 𝐾𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒(𝐵𝐿𝑅𝐺𝑖) 
====================== 
∀ 𝑅𝐺𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝐺 
     𝐼𝐹 (𝐵𝐿𝑅𝐺𝑗 ≥ 𝐵𝐿𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑) 
            𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡+= 𝐾𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 (𝐵𝐿𝑅𝐺𝑗) 
====================== 
𝐼𝐹 (𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 ≥ 𝑀𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 &&  𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 > 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) 
          𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 = 1 
 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐼𝐹(𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 ≥ 𝑀𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 &&  𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 > 𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) 
          𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 = 0 
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
          𝑆𝑅𝐹𝐷 = 𝑆𝑅𝐶𝐻 
 





   𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 0; 
       𝐼𝐹 3 ≤ 𝐵𝐿𝑅𝐺𝑚 ≤ 4 
                       𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 3; 
 
      𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐼𝐹 2.5 ≤ 𝐵𝐿𝑅𝐺𝑚 < 3 
                       𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 2; 
 
       𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐼𝐹 2 ≤ 𝐵𝐿𝑅𝐺𝑚 < 2.5 
                       𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 1; 
 
      𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐼𝐹 𝐵𝐿𝑅𝐺𝑚 < 2 
                       𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 0; 





4.2.4 Reward/Penalty Mechanism 
CH adjusts the belief level of each node based on whether a node is to be rewarded or penalized. 
Each “GOOD” behaving node will be rewarded by increasing its BL. Each “BAD” behaving node 
will be penalized by decreasing its BL and applying a proper penalty action according to a value 
called Adjustment Factor (AF) that is calculated by CH as in equation (4.1). It is then added to the 
latest value of BL as in equation (4.2). AF is calculated according to the number of “GOOD” and 
“BAD” reports sent by the reporting nodes about the reported node. 
𝑎𝑡 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒  
𝐴𝐹𝑆𝑈𝑖 = (∑ ∝ ∗  ℕ(𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑔)
𝐺
𝑔=1,≠𝑖 ) − (∑  𝛽 ∗  ℕ(𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑏)
𝐵
𝑏=1,≠𝑖 )        (4.1)  
               𝑠. 𝑡. −4 ≤ 𝐴𝐹 ≤ 4 
 
where G and B represent the number of nodes, which decide that 𝑆𝑈𝑖  is a good or bad node, 
respectively. ∝ is the rewarding factor, and 𝛽 is the penalizing factor, ℕ(𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑏) is the normalized 
belief level of the node which reports that 𝑆𝑈𝑖 is a bad node, and ℕ(𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑔) is the normalized 
belief level of the node which reports that 𝑆𝑈𝑖 is a good node. The rewarding factor and the 
penalizing factor are chosen as in real life where penalty has more weight than rewarding.   
(𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑖)𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒
= (𝐴𝐹𝑆𝑈𝑖) + (𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑖)𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒−1
                    (4.2) 
Equation (4.2) finds the updated value of belief level of each cluster node at every reporting round, 
where (BLSUi)𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒−1
is the belief level in the previous updating round. 
 
The maximum and minimum values of AF is 4 and -4 respectively, i.e. if AF value is more than 
4, it will be set to 4 and if it is less than -4 it will be set to -4. The BL of each reporting cluster 
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node is important in the process of finding the AF; the higher the BL of a reporting cluster node 
is, the higher the effect on the AF value is.  
Normal behaving sensing nodes will be rewarded for their normal behavior, which allows them to 
gain higher belief level in the cluster. Consequently, the normal behaving node benefits from that 
as it can have enough resources to fulfill its QoS requirements. On the other hand, an adversary 
node (attacker) is penalized by decrementing its BL and applying penalty action(s) for its abnormal 
activity in the network. The penalty mechanism affects the attacker throughput as that decreases 
its belief level and reduces the resources assigned to it, which therefore results in a low throughput. 
Consequently, the desire of other cluster nodes to communicate with the misbehaving node during 
data transmission phase is low; hence, no node will want to behave in an abnormal way. CH 
penalizes the adversary node by applying the proper penalty actions according to the AF value. 
These penalty actions are: 
• P1: give a time out for three sensing rounds.  
• P2: de-allocate 50% of the assigned resources to the adversary node, where resources are 
the channels allocated to the user SUi at the end of the negotiation phase during the 
authentication process. 
• P3: de-allocate all resources and disconnect this adversary node.  
• P4: mark the adversary node as an undesirable node.  
Table 4.1 shows the proposed penalty scheme which depends on other cluster nodes’ decision 
about each other. 
TABLE 4.1 PENALTY SCHEME 
Adjustment Factor (AF) Penalty Action(s) 
−1 < AF ≤ 0 No extra penalty 
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−2 < AF ≤ −1 P1 
−3 < AF ≤ −2 P1 and P2 
−4 < AF ≤ −3 P3 
−4 P3 and P4 
 
4.2.5 Analysis of Detection and False Alarm Probability 
We use the value of K (calculated as in Algorithm 4.1 in Section 4.3.3) to formulate the detection 
probability 𝑃𝐷
𝐵𝐿 which is the probability of identifying a malicious reported node as malicious or 
the probability of identifying a used spectrum as used, as shown in equation (4.3). 
 
𝑃𝐷






𝐶−𝑖 , 𝐾 < 𝐶
      1                                           𝐾 ≥ 𝐶   
                           (4.3) 
where 𝑃𝑑 denotes the individual detection probability of the reporting node, and 𝐶 is the number 
of SUs in each cluster. 
A malicious reporting node is a node that sends false sensing-reputation reports to CH. A false 
sensing-reputation report is a report that has a false opinion about a reported node or a false sensing 
result. When CH receives the sensing-reputation reports from the reporting nodes, it analyzes these 
reports to find if the reporting/reported node is an adversary node or not. The probability for CH 
to make a wrong decision about the reporting/reported node or about the spectrum availability is 
denoted as probability of false alarm, 𝑃𝐹(𝐶, 𝐾), as in equation (4.4) where 𝑃𝑓 denotes the 
individual false alarm probability of the reporting node, (i.e. it is the probability that the reporting 
node erroneously transmit a false sensing-reputation to the CH). 
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, 𝐾 < 𝐶
      1                                             𝐾 ≥ 𝐶     
                    (4.4) 
A malicious reporting node (𝑆𝑈𝑧) will try to send false sensing-reputation reports to CH with a 
probability of success 𝑃𝑠








                         (4.5) 
where 𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑧 is the belief level of the malicious reporting node (𝑆𝑈𝑧) and 𝐵𝑉 is the number of bad 
votes about 𝑆𝑈𝑧. 
The probability of false alarm using our mechanism can be expressed as in equation (4.6) where 
 𝑃𝐹(𝐶, 𝐾) is obtained from equation (4.4). 
𝑃𝐹
𝐵𝐿 = ∑ ∏ [𝑃𝑠
𝑆𝑈𝑧] 𝑧∈(1,𝑖) ∏ [1 − 𝑃𝑠
𝑆𝑈𝑧)]𝑧∈(1,𝑖)
𝑌
𝑖=1 𝑃𝐹(𝐶, 𝐾)             (4.6) 
where 𝑌 is the number of malicious reporting nodes, and 𝐾 represents the total number of votes of 
the malicious reporting node(s) about the same reported node. 𝐾 is calculated in the same way as 
in the K-rule used for the spectrum sensing decision, however this time the 𝐵𝐿𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 is equal to 
2.5 (i.e. the node(s) should have a BL value higher than or equal to 2.5 in order for its sensing-
reputation report to be analyzed by the CH). The reason behind that is to consider the reputation 
part of the sensing-reputation reports sent only by trusted nodes with high BLs. 
Collusive cluster nodes or compromised node(s) can send false sensing results or report a benign 
node as misbehaving node. In the case of targeting a benign node, the collusion attack occurs if 
multiple nodes report to CH about a benign node that this benign node is a “BAD” node while in 
real it is not. Our approach prevents any node from acting as a collusive node or compromised 
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node by analyzing and comparing the different reports sent by different cluster nodes about the 
benign node. In other words, CH applies one of five different actions to the reported and the 
reporting nodes. These actions are A1 (Do nothing), A2 (Increment its BL), A3 (Decrement its 
BL), A4 (Decrement its BL after five nonconsecutive or three consecutive “BAD” reports about 
its neighboring reported node), and A5 (Penalize the adversary node by one of the penalty actions). 
4.3 Performance Evaluation 
4.3.1 Complexity Analysis 
In this section, we discuss the complexity of the monitoring nodes behavior algorithm proposed, 
including the sensing phase, in terms of computation overhead and communication overhead. In 
our proposed algorithm, all SUs are divided into different clusters and the cluster nodes 
communicate with their CHs instead of communicating with a centralized point (i.e. FC). This 
reduces the amount of computation and resource management; therefore, improves the security 
level of the network. 
Firstly, we analyze the computation overhead in the proposed approach and in the centralized model 
with no clusters. In the centralized model with no clusters, a bidirectional way of messaging 
between all SUs and the FC is used. Therefore, the FC needs to manipulate 2 ∗ |M| messages, where 
M represents the total number of SUs. In the proposed model using clusters, the FC manipulates 2 ∗
|K|, where K represents the number of cluster heads. The computation overhead at the FC in both 
approaches is ≈ 𝑂(𝑀) and  ≈ 𝑂(𝐾), respectively. However, |K| < |𝑀|; therefore, our approach 
reduces the computation overhead at the FC. 
In our proposed approach, the number of messages that the CH has to manipulate is |N| messages, 
where N represents the number of SUs in the cluster. Therefore, the computation overhead at the 
CH is ≈ 𝑂(𝑁). 
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Secondly, we use the number of messages exchanged to also calculate the communication overhead. 
The number of messages is equal to that used in the computation overhead calculation; therefore, 
the communication overhead at the FC with no clustering is ≈ O(M), at the FC with clustering is ≈
𝑂(𝐾), and at the CH is ≈ 𝑂(𝑁) where |𝐾| < |𝑁| < |𝑀|. 
4.3.2 Simulation Environment Setup 
We simulate the proposed approach using MATLAB to identify the adversary sensing nodes during 
the spectrum sensing phase. Table 4.2 shows the network simulated with values used for the 
parameters required in our approach. We use two different values of 𝐵𝐿𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 . It is equal to 2 
when the algorithm is applied to find the available spectrum channels, while it is 2.5 when the 
algorithm is used to detect the adversary nodes. The reason behind that is sending a reputation 
decision about other nodes is more important than sensing a sensing decision about the spectrum. 
In other words, a node should have a higher BL in order to analyze its reputation decision of its 
sensing-reputation report by the CH. The simulation results are analyzed from two perspectives. 
First, the importance and the effects of the concepts used in the proposed approach such as 
(monitoring nodes behavior, BL, K-rule, and detection and false alarm probability) are analyzed as 
shown in Figures 4.2-4.5. Second, a comparison is made between the proposed approach and the 
other approaches in the literature in terms of detection probability and false alarm probability as 
shown in Figures 4.6-4.8. The detection probability found in equation (4.3) of our approach is 
compared with that of INCA [44] and with two other approaches as we refer them as Model A and 
Model B proposed in [39] and [40] respectively. Moreover, we compare the false alarm probability 
found in equation (4.6) in our approach with that in Model A and Model B [39-40]. 
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TABLE 4.2 SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
Parameter   Value 
Number of SUs [0-125] 
Number of Clusters [0-15] 
Number of malicious nodes 5% of SUs 
𝛼 0.3 
𝛽 0.7 
𝐵𝐿𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 2 (for the spectrum sensing final decision) 





4.3.3 Numerical Results 
The normal behavior of any cluster node in our proposed model is illustrated in Fig. 4.2 as each 
node starts with a moderate belief level and keeps gaining more belief through the spectrum 
sensing phase until it reaches the maximum belief level of four. All nodes aim at increasing 
their BL in the network. On the other hand, the adversary node (even with a maximum belief 
level value of four) can have its belief level decreased to the minimum value of zero due to its 




Figure 4.2: Belief Level over Time. 
          
Figure 4.3: Transmission Rate over Time. 
The transmission rate in our proposed model is compared with and without monitoring nodes 
behavior as shown in Fig. 4.3. We assume all nodes initially achieve 70 percent of their desired 























































Without Monitoring Nodes Behavior
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transmission rate. The behavior of the trusted nodes, the semi-misbehaving nodes and the full-
misbehaving node is monitored. The normal behavior of the trusted node makes its BL increase 
and therefore, its transmission rate increases gradually. The semi-misbehaving node lures some 
nodes in the cluster; therefore, those nodes vote “BAD” while other nodes vote “GOOD” about its 
behavior. Overall, its BL relatively decreases (i.e. |AF| is less than 3) and therefore its transmission 
rate decreases. The transmission rate of the full-misbehaving node that lures all nodes in the cluster 
decreases rapidly and its BL reaches zero in a shorter time; since, all the cluster nodes vote “BAD” 
about its behavior (i.e. |AF| is greater than 3). The transmission rate of an adversary node without 
monitoring its behavior (i.e. no BL associated to the node’s behavior) is also measured. It is found 
that its transmission rate decreases and reaches zero faster due to its malicious behavior.   
     Figure 4.4 illustrates the effects of the different number of nodes in a cluster with their BL on 
the detection probability. It is depicted that with a higher BL, the detection probability increases 
and (i.e. reaches the maximum value of one) due to the increase in the number of the cooperating 
SUs. Therefore, when more SUs that have high BL participate in the sensing phase, the detection 
is completed faster. 
     Figure 4.5 shows the effects of applying two different K rules on the detection probability in 
our proposed approach. We assume that the number of SUs in a cluster is 12. In the first K-rule 
(50%), the detection probability reaches the maximum value of one, when 50% of the users (i.e. 
six out of twelve SUs) successfully have the same decision. While in our proposed K-rule, the 
detection probability reaches the maximum value of one when fewer users (i.e. four out of twelve 
SUs), which have higher BL, make the same decision. In comparison with the 50% K-rule, the 




Figure 4.4: Effects of BL on Detection Probability in Proposed Approach. 
 
Figure 4.5: Effect of two K rules on Detection Probability in Proposed Approach. 
 


































































Figure 4.6 compares the detection probability of our proposed model, INCA [44] and Models A 
and B [39-40]. The detection probability increases when number of sensing SU nodes increases. 
In INCA, the maximum detection probability is 0.5. In our proposed approach using the proposed 
K-rule, the detection probability continues to increase to a maximum value of one, where at least 
nine out of twenty-one nodes in the cluster decide that a node is an adversary node (i.e. number of 
“BAD” reports B=9 nodes). The detection probability in Models A and B keeps increasing; 
however, it reaches the maximum value of one when all the cluster nodes participate in the 
detection process. Therefore, our approach outperforms the INCA approach as well as Models A 
and B as it can reach the maximum value of the detection probability and in a shorter time. 
Figure 4.7 compares the false alarm probability of our proposed approach with that of Model A 
[39] and Model B [40]. In Model A and Model B, the 50% K-rule is applied, while in our proposed 
model the proposed K-rule is used to calculate the percentage of votes. It is clear from the figure 
that the false alarm probability decreases as the percentage of votes (i.e. number of the nodes 
participating in the spectrum sensing process) increases. Our proposed model with the proposed 
K-rule lowers the false alarm probability compared to the other two models with a reduction of 
more than 60%. Therefore, our proposed approach outperforms Model A and Model B in terms of 
lowering the false alarm probability. 
In Figure 4.8, the false alarm probability of our proposed model is again compared with that of 
Model A and Model B, but this time, with respect to the number of malicious (adversary) nodes in 
the network. It is depicted from the figure that our proposed model with the proposed K-rule 
outperforms the other two models when the number of malicious nodes increases. The punishment 
scheme applied by the CH against any malicious node is a possible reason for this advantage. 




Figure 4.6: Detection Probability (Proposed Approach vs. other Models). 
 
Figure 4.7: A Comparison of False Alarm Probability vs. Percentage of Votes. 
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Figure 4.8: A Comparison of False Alarm Probability vs. Malicious Nodes. 
4.4 Security Analysis 
The proposed model prevents any node from acting in a misbehaving way. Different attacks that 
might occur because of the abnormal behavior of network nodes (adversary nodes) are 
eliminated by our proposed collaborative approach.  
We show here some attacks that can be detected and mitigated by our collaborative approach. 
Note that all the simulation results of the detection probability and false alarm probability in the 












































4.4.1 PUE Attack Analysis  
PUEA is launched when one node emulates the PU by sending signals over PUs channels. When 
SUs sense the PUs channels, they will receive signals over these channels stating that a PU is 
present in its channels, while in reality, it is a node that is emulating the real PU. We assume that 
there is one node emulating PU and sending signals over PUs channels and there is no real PUs 
using the channels. When SUs sense the PUs channels and receive signals over these channels, 
each SU compares the received signals with the expected signals in order to check if the received 
signals belong to a real PU or an adversary node that emulates PU. Based on this comparison, if 
the sensing node decides that the spectrum is busy, the malicious node is performing as an active 
PUEA, otherwise it is a passive PUEA. We mitigate both the active and passive PUEA in our 
approach by applying the collaboration between the different sensing nodes, our belief level 
mechanism, and making the final sensing decision based on all the sensing nodes’ decisions and 
not based on one node’s decision only.  More specifically, by applying our proposed K-rule, the 
SU with the higher BL has a higher weight in making the final decision if the received signal is 
from a real PU or not. If a node, after analyzing the received signal, decides that this received 
signal belongs to an emulator, it will send a special sensing-reputation report to its neighbors and 
CH. CH will collect these special reputation reports and analyze them to make the final decision 
and based on that the passive PUEA is mitigated. The detection of a PUEA will be faster when the 




Figure 4.9: Detection Probability of PUEA. 
In the case of M SUs sense the spectrum, which have the maximum BL, the detection of PUEA 
will be faster than that when at least one node does not have the maximum BL. In case of all the 
nodes are new nodes, which are joining the cluster for the first time (i.e. their BL value is still 
moderate and have each a value of two), the detection probability will not be high enough in the 
first sensing round. However, as the sensing is carried out over multiple rounds, the BL of the 
nodes will increase and the detection probability will continue to increase. The active PUEA is 
mitigated by the use of the symmetric-key cryptography; since, a node can emulate a PU if it has 
its shared symmetric key with other nodes, which is not the case in our proposed approach. If a 
node is an emulating PU, it has to have the PU’s symmetric key to send messages over the PUs 
channels. We simulate a scenario with multiple SUs with different BLs and show the results in 
Figure 4.9. In this scenario, we assume that a node emulates a PU and it has a BL initially equal to 
three. We compare the detection probability in three cases: ten SUs with initial BL equal to two, 





























18 SUs with Initial BL = 3
14 SUs with Initial BL = 2.5
10 SUs with Initial BL = 2
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fourteen SUs with initial BL equal to two and a half, and eighteen SUs with initial BL equal to 
three. It is depicted that the detection probability increases with the time elapse as the BL of the 
reporting SUs increases and the number of the reporting SUs, which have higher BL, increases. A 
higher BL of a normal behaving node and a higher number of reporting nodes lead to PUEA 
detection in a shorter time. 
4.4.2 SSDF Attack Analysis 
The attacker might send false sensing results to its neighbors stating that the PU is present in its 
band, when in fact, the PU is not present. The attacker’s intention is to gain exclusive access to 
the spectrum and to prevent other nodes from using the spectrum efficiently. Another form of this 
attack is when the attacker falsely states that the PU is absent in its band. In this case, the attacker 
aims to cause interference with the PU and consequently, the PU’s QoS is degraded. In both forms, 
the SSDF might be active or passive. If a malicious node sends its false sensing result to other 
nodes and the final sensing result was the same as the malicious node’s sensing result, active 
SSDF is launched, otherwise SSDF is passive.  Our approach will detect this malicious behavior 
that leads to active or passive SSDF by applying the collaboration, BL management, and 
monitoring nodes mechanisms (i.e. each node votes about its neighboring nodes behavior). The 
final spectrum sensing decision is made based on all the nodes sensing results and in different 
consecutive sensing rounds (i.e. if one node succeeded to launch SSDF in one sensing round, its 
chance for relaunching SSDF decreases in the next sensing rounds). With active SSDF attack, the 
malicious behavior of the node is detected by other nodes that have the opposite sensing decision. 
Therefore, the votes’ weight of the malicious node will be decreased as the sensing time elapse.  
Moreover, the CH as a trustworthy node can decide if any node is sending false sensing results or 
false reports about other nodes. In the case of passive SSDF attack, monitoring nodes’ behavior 
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and analysis of their behavior, which is done by the CH, reduce the nodes’ BL and their votes’ 
weight; hence, passive SSDF is mitigated. 
All the nodes will rely on CH’s final decision about the spectrum availability. According to our 
analysis, a malicious node’s chance to launch the SSDF attack is high when the node has a high 
BL or fewer nodes decide that a node is a malicious node. On the other hand, this chance decreases 
when the number of nodes that decide if a node is a malicious node increases (i.e. when the 
malicious node's BL decreases). During the reporting rounds, the number of nodes, which decide 
that a node is a malicious node, increases if the malicious node’s sensing results oppose their 
sensing results, and therefore the malicious node’s BL decreases with the reporting time elapse. 
When the malicious node sends false reports to the CH, the other cluster nodes will vote “BAD” 
for it and consequently, its BL is decreased. 
4.4.3 DoS Attack Analysis 
It might be launched at the CH; since, a joining node might show a good behavior at the joining 
time to become a CH, and then it acts abnormally and cheats about the honesty of other nodes. 
This adversary joining node aims to reduce the other nodes’ belief level value and reduce the 
network throughput. Such a behavior is prevented by our proposed approach as the clusters are 
being dynamically reformed whenever a new node is admitted to the network or when a node has 
a BL that is higher than the CH’s BL. Therefore; the cluster heads are not fixed all the time. 
Moreover, each normal behaving cluster node that is penalized by its malicious CH contacts the 
FC, which takes appropriate actions against the malicious CH. 
It might be launched at SU level as an SU might send any sensing result about the spectrum to its 
neighbors or send “BAD” reports about its neighboring nodes in order to degrade their QoS and 
prevent them from achieving their desired service. It is prevented by applying our proposed reports 
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analysis and punishment mechanisms, as any node, which sends false sensing information or false 
opinion about other nodes, will be punished with proper penalty action depending on the severity 
of the launched DoS attack. Every node is monitored and its behavior is evaluated at the end of 
every reporting round. Therefore, for any node to stay in the network and keep using its resources, 
it has to act normally in the network. 
4.4.4 Objective Function Attack Analysis 
The attacker tries to change the radio parameters (such as center frequency, bandwidth, power, 
modulation type, coding rate, channel access protocol, encryption type, and frame size) to reduce 
the network objective, which is always to have higher security and higher transmission rate. Any 
change in these parameters will lead to false sensing results of other nodes and might lead to 
launch PUE attack. However, by applying our proposed BL management scheme and penalty 
mechanism, a node will not have the opportunity to change any of these parameters. Our proposed 
approach reduces the resources assigned to the misbehaving node, which reduces the opportunity 
for the misbehaving node to change the radio parameters. If a node launches this attack, other 
nodes will notify CH about the abnormal behavior of this node. Therefore, CH applies appropriate 
penalty actions, such as deallocating part of the resources, which weakens its ability to perform 
such an attack.   
4.4.5 Collusion Attack Analysis 
As the collusive reporting node sends false reports about its neighboring node(s), CH uses the 
reports sent by its next node(s) to determine the correctness of its reports. Incorrect reports are 
determined upon the comparison of the reports sent by the reporting node, other nodes’ reports 
and CH’s sensing decision itself. Such a comparison leads to identify the compromised and 
collusive nodes in the network. No node will like to have its belief level reduced, or be considered 
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as compromised or collusive node. By the role of CH and applying the penalty scheme, a node 
will send true reports about its neighboring node(s) and will not send false reports to protect itself 
from being penalized or considered as a collusive or compromised node.  
Another form of collusion attack is when multiple nodes agreed about reporting a benign node as 
a “BAD” node, when the node is not “BAD”. When CH receives the reputation reports from the 
collusive nodes about the benign node, it analyzes the reports sent by the collusive nodes about 
the benign node and the reports sent by the benign node about the collusive. Based on that analysis, 
CH can tell if the “BAD” reports are true or false reports. Consequently, the CH takes the 
appropriate actions against the collusive nodes or the misbehaving node. Hence, detecting the 
collusive nodes will become easier and faster with time as the BL of the collusive nodes will be 
decreased. As a result, their reports will have no high effect on other benign nodes.  
4.5 Summary 
Securing the spectrum sensing process in CRN is very important as adversary nodes might 
behave in different abnormal ways to launch different attacks that degrade the spectrum sensing 
reliability. Therefore, the network security and throughput will be reduced. Current mechanisms 
of attack detection focus on addressing the attacks independently or two kinds of attacks a time, 
which is not realistic, as multiple attacks can exist simultaneously.  
Monitoring nodes behavior during the spectrum sensing process helps to identify and eliminate 
adversary nodes from the network, which improves the accuracy of the sensing results, the network 
security and the performance. 
In this paper, we propose a collaborative approach during the spectrum sensing process that 
focuses on monitoring the nodes’ behavior rather than addressing the attacks themselves. It works 
as a proactive approach to passive attacks and as a reactive approach to active attacks. In the 
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proposed approach, all sensing nodes monitor the behavior of each other to identify the adversary 
nodes.  
The simulation results show the performance of our proposed approach compared to other 
models. This approach improves the detection probability and false alarm probability, which 
increases the network security and implicitly enhances the spectrum utilization and network 
throughput. Moreover, the security analysis shows the different kind of active and passive attacks 


















5. Chapter 5: A Routing Algorithm for Spectrum 
Management phase 
In this chapter, a compound secure routing algorithm based on nodes’ behavior during the 
spectrum sensing phase is proposed. It uses node’s belief level (BL), proposed in Chapter 4, which 
measures how secure the nodes’ behavior is during the spectrum sensing phase. The routing 
algorithm combines security (node’s BL) as a routing metric with two other routing metrics, which 
are the probability of PU presence and the channel cost in terms of delay. The algorithm proposed 
relies on the public-key and symmetric-key cryptography to encrypt/decrypt the messages 
transmitted during the route establishment, route maintenance, and data forwarding phases. 
Therefore, this cryptography prevents any malicious node from eavesdropping on these messages, 
from altering them and/or from participating in the packets routing over the network. The proposed 
approach aims at building secure routes that contain trusted nodes only, which improves the 
network performance in terms of end-to-end delay, packet delivery ratio, packet loss ratio and 
routing overhead. The nodes’ behavior during the routing phase is monitored by each other. The 
nodes will send reputation reports, same as in the sensing reputation reports (Chapter 4), about their 
neighboring nodes behavior to the CH, which takes care of analyzing them to identify the adversary 
nodes that selectively drop or does not forward the routing packets to its neighboring node(s). The 
process of analyzing these reputation reports is same as that used in Chapter 4.  
The main contributions and the characteristics of the proposed approach can be summarized as 
follows: 
• To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to address the issue of considering 
security as a routing metric in the CRNs. Security in the proposed approach is in terms 
of providing resources’ access to secure nodes only, as well as securing the message 
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exchange process over the network. By doing so, we secure the different routes and 
therefore the network security and performance are implicitly enhanced. 
• To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to combine the spectrum sensing and 
the routing phases in the CRNs by using the nodes’ behavior during the spectrum sensing 
phase to find the best secure paths. 
• The proposed approach uses three different routing metrics combined: the nodes’ BL, 
the probability of PU presence, and the channel cost. 
• The proposed approach is able to adapt any changes in the PUs activity as the probability 
of the PU’s presence is considered as a routing metric. Therefore, the routing paths will 
be more stable, which makes the proposed approach more reliable. 
• The proposed approach is a cross-layering approach as the channel status and the PU’s 
activity at the physical and data link layers affect the routes establishment at the network 
layer. 
• The proposed approach assigns different weight to the three-routing metrics used for 
finding the best paths. It focuses more on the nodes’ BL, which is the main metric. 
Therefore, it implicitly minimizes the route establishment time and maintenance cost. 
• The proposed algorithm is evaluated and verified in terms of security functionality, its 
correctness and its performance. This proves that it is safe against attacks and it performs 
better in comparison to the other approaches. 
This chapter is organized as follows: firstly. the system requirements and the general 
assumptions are shown in Section 5.1. It is followed by describing the proposed routing 
algorithm and showing its complexity in Section 5.2. Next, a case study is investigated by 
90 
 
applying the proposed routing in Section 5.3. After that, the performance of the proposed 
algorithm is measured and compared with other approaches in the literature in Section 5.4. Next 
in Section 5.5, the proposed approach is validated formally through a verification tool. The 
chapter is concluded with a summary in Section 5.6. 
5.1 System Requirements and General Assumptions 
The system requirements and general assumptions used in Chapter 4 are also applied to the 
routing algorithm as the routing algorithm is built based on the monitoring nodes behavior technique 
proposed in Chapter 4. 
5.2 The Routing Algorithm 
5.2.1 Preface 
As described in Chapter 4, all the clusters nodes perform the spectrum sensing process to find 
the vacant spectrum channels. Each sensing node forwards its sensing decision which is saved in a 
parameter called sensing result (SR) to its neighbors. Then, it compares its own SR with the received 
SR from its neighboring node and if they match, the sensing node decides that its neighboring node 
is a “GOOD” node; otherwise it is a “BAD” node. Finally, it prepares sensing-reputation reports 
about their neighboring node(s). CH makes the final decision about the spectrum availability based 
on the reports sent by different nodes and their BL values and forwards the final decision to its 
cluster nodes as described in Algorithm 4.1 (Chapter 4). The calculated BL will be used in the 
routing algorithm as a routing metric combined with other routing parameters. 
5.2.2 The Algorithm 
Our proposed approach aims to find the best path between the source and the destination nodes. 
As mentioned earlier, a best path is a one that includes all the best next nodes that have the highest 
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BL, the lowest probability of PU presence, and the lowest channel cost. Best next node (BNN) of 
each node is found according to the following general objective function in equation 5.1: 
𝐹(𝐵𝑁𝑁) = max (𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑗) + min(𝑃𝑃𝑈) + min(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐ℎ)          (5.1)       
where 𝐹(𝐵𝑁𝑁) is the function of best next node, 𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑗 is the next node’s BL, 𝑃𝑃𝑈 is the probability 
of PU’s presence over next channel, and 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐ℎ is the cost of the channel between the current node 
and its next node, which is the delay in our proposed routing algorithm. 
The proposed routing algorithm is described step by step in Algorithm 5.1. It defines all the 
parameters and the functions that are used to implement the algorithm. The algorithm starts where 
CH sends to each node the BL of its next node(s), the channel(s) cost and the probability of PU 
presence over those channels. Then, each current cluster node (𝑆𝑈𝑖) finds the inverse of its next 
node(s) BL as 𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑗
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 = 1/𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑗 and saves it with the channel(s) cost and the probability of PU 
presence over those channels in a table called Next Nodes Information (NNI) shown in Table 5.1. 
Each node (𝑆𝑈𝑖) has its own NNI table that is used by each node to find its best next node among 
its different neighboring nodes. After that, (𝑆𝑈𝑖) arranges the nodes, for each parameter, in an 
ascending order by using the 𝑆𝑜𝑟𝑡(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟) function. Then, (𝑆𝑈𝑖) applies the weight 
coefficient of each parameter to the nodes’ order in order to find a value namely, 𝑉𝑆𝑈𝑗, which will 
be used to find the best next node. The objective function, shown in equation (5.2), is used to find 
the best next node. According to the objective function, the best next node is the node that has the 
smallest 𝑉𝑆𝑈𝑗. Finally, all the best next nodes are appended together to form the best path.  
𝐹(𝐵𝑁𝑁) = 𝑀𝐼𝑁((𝜇 ∗ 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 (𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑗
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒)) + (𝜀 ∗ 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐ℎ)) + (𝜗 ∗ 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟(𝑃𝑃𝑈))) (5.2) 
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where, 𝜇 is the weight coefficient of the inverse BL parameter and equals to 0.5, 𝜀 is the weight 
coefficient of the channel cost parameter and equals to 0.2, and 𝜗 is the weight coefficient of 
the probability of PU presence parameter and equals to 0.3.  
TABLE 5.1 NEXT NODES INFORMATION (NNI) 
Next Node ID Inversed BL Channel Cost Probability of PU Presence 
 
ALGORITHM 5.1 THE ROUTING ALGORITHM 
Parameters: 
𝑀:         the set of SUs. 
𝑋:          a subset of M that represents the next nodes of the current node. 
𝐾:          the set of Channels. 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐ℎ : the Channel’s cost. 
𝑆𝑈𝑠𝑟𝑐 :   the source node. 
𝑆𝑈𝑑𝑒𝑠 :   the destination node. 
𝑆𝑈𝑐𝑢𝑟  :  the current node. 
𝑆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 :  the next node. 
𝑆𝑈𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡  :  the best next node. 
𝐾𝑐𝑢𝑟→𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡  :      the channel between the current node and its next node. 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐾𝑐𝑢𝑟→𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡:  the cost of the channel between the current node and its next node. 
𝐵𝐿𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 :        the node’s inverse BL. 
𝑃𝑃𝑈:                  the probability of PU’s presence. 
𝑉𝑆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡  :            the calculated value in the objective function. 
Next Nodes Information (NNI) Table:  a table maintained by current SU which 
includes information about its neighboring (next) nodes: Node ID, Inverse BL, 
Channel Cost, and Probability of PU Presence. 
Save (Inverse BL, Channel Cost, and Probability of PU Presence): a function 
applied by current SU to save the information of its next nodes in NNI.  
𝑩𝑷𝒂𝒕𝒉{𝑩𝑵𝑵}: a list used to build the best path between any two nodes by appending 
the best next node of each node in the path. 
 
Initialize 
For each 𝑆𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝑀  
    CH sends (𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 , 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐾𝑖→𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 , 𝑃𝑃𝑈) 
EndFor 
For each 𝑆𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝑀  
    𝑆𝑈𝑐𝑢𝑟 = 𝑆𝑈𝑖    
    For each 𝑆𝑈𝑗 ∈ 𝑋  
           𝑆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝑆𝑈𝑗 
            𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑗
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 = 1/𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑗 
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          𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒(𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑗
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 , 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐾𝑖→𝑗 , 𝑃𝑃𝑈) 
    EndFor  
EndFor 
 
Sort of Next Nodes 
For each 𝑆𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝑀  
    For each 𝑆𝑈𝑗 ∈ 𝑋         
           𝑆𝑜𝑟𝑡(𝐵𝐿𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒) 
           𝑆𝑜𝑟𝑡 (𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐾𝑖→𝑗) 
           𝑆𝑜𝑟𝑡(𝑃𝑃𝑈) 
    EndFor 
EndFor  
 
Finding the Best Next Node 
For each 𝑆𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝑀 
     For each 𝑆𝑈𝑗 ∈ 𝑋 
    𝑉𝑆𝑈𝑗 = (𝜇 ∗ 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 (𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑗
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒)) + (𝜀 ∗ 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 (𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐾𝑖→𝑗)) + (𝜗 ∗ 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟(𝑃𝑃𝑈)) 
      EndFor 
     𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 =  𝑀𝐼𝑁( 𝑉𝑆𝑈) 
    𝐵𝑁𝑁 = 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑂𝑓(𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙) 
 





1. If the current node has multiple nodes as BNN, i.e. multiple nodes have the 
same value of 𝑉𝑆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 : 
➢ The current node chooses the neighboring node that has 𝑀𝐼𝑁(𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒). 
➢ If multiple nodes have the same 𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒, the current node chooses the 
neighboring node that has 𝑀𝐼𝑁(𝑃𝑃𝑈). 
➢ If multiple nodes have the same 𝑃𝑃𝑈, the current node chooses the 
neighboring node that has 𝑀𝐼𝑁(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐾𝑐𝑢𝑟→𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡). 
➢ If multiple nodes have the same 𝐵𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒, 𝑃𝑃𝑈, and 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑢𝑟→𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡, the 
current node chooses any of the neighboring nodes. 




5.3 Case Study 
In this section, we study a case scenario in order to show how our proposed routing algorithm 
works. Figure 5.1 shows the network scenario. 
 
Figure 5.1:  A Routing Scenario. 
In Table 5.2, we show each node’s information, which is its ID, its BL, its neighbors, the channel 
cost, and the probability of PU presence over each channel, with the assumption that there is at 
least one channel between each two SUs. We assume that SU0 wants to communicate with SU18. 
We apply our proposed algorithm to find the best path between the source node (SU0) and the 
destination node (SU18). Each node finds its best next hop, and then each next hop is added to a 
list. When these nodes accumulate in this manner, the best path is formed. The values of the weight 
coefficients used in this case study are same as in Section 5.2.2. 
TABLE 5.2 THE ROUTING METRICS VALUES USED FOR THE SCENARIO 





probability over that 
channel 
0 3.4 1,2 9, 6 0.4, 0.52 
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1 2.8 3,4 6, 3 0.36, 0.29 
2 3.8 4,5,6 8, 7, 4 0.18, 0.43, 0.72 
3 2.4 7 5 0.25 
4 3 7 3 0.74 
5 3.7 7, 8, 9, 10 3, 5, 6, 4 0.16, 0.24, 0.31, 0.36 
6 2.5 10 12 0.17 
7 2.4 13 9 0.81 
8 3.4 11,12 4, 3 0.31, 0.19 
9 2.7 12 3 0.23 
10 2.8 11,12 6,9 0.54, 0.19 
11 3.7 13, 14, 15 4, 8, 2 0.34, 0.21, 0.76 
12 3.3 17 3 0.41 
13 3 16, 17 5, 2 0.34, 0.12 
14 2.5 18 8 0.43 
15 2.7 18 16 0.27 
16 2.6 18 4 0.68 
17 2.5 18 5 0.19 
18 3.4 10 3 0.35 
 
At the source Node (SU0): 









Prob. of PU 
presenceorder 
𝐕𝐒𝐔 
SU1 0.362 9 2 0.40 1 0 1.7 
SU2 0.261 6 1 0.52 2 0 1.1 
 
Based on the objective function calculation results and according to the routing algorithm, the 
Source SU0 chooses SU2 as its next hop. 
The best path includes SU0SU2 
 
At SU2 
SU2 can choose SU4, SU5, or SU6 as its next node. SU2 does the following calculations: 




Prob. of PU 
presenceorder 
𝐕𝐒𝐔 
SU4 0.332 8 3 0.18 1 0 1.9 
SU5 0.401 7 2 0.43 2 0 1.5 
SU6 0.273 4 1 0.72 3 0 2.6 
 
Based on the objective function calculation results and according to the routing algorithm, SU2 
chooses SU5 as its next hop. 
The best path includes SU0SU2SU5 
At SU5 
SU5 can choose SU7, SU8, SU9, or SU10 as its next node. SU5 does the following calculations: 
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Prob. of PU 
presenceorder 
𝐕𝐒𝐔 
SU7 0.424 3 1 0.16 1 0 2.5 
SU8 0.291 5 2 0.24 2 0 1.5 
SU9 0.373 6 4 0.31 3 0 3.2 
SU10 0.362 4 3 0.36 4 0 2.8 
 
Based on the objective function calculation results and according to the routing algorithm, SU5 
chooses SU8 as its next hop. 
The best path includes SU0SU2SU5SU8 
At SU8 
SU8 can choose either SU11 or SU12 as its next node. SU8 does the following calculations: 




Prob. of PU 
presenceorder 
𝐕𝐒𝐔 
SU11 0.271 4 2 0.31 2 0 1.5 
SU12 0.302 3 1 0.19 1 0 1.6 
 
Based on the objective function calculation results and according to the routing algorithm, SU8 
chooses SU11 as its next hop. 
The best path includes SU0SU2SU5SU8SU11 
At SU11 
SU11 can choose SU13, SU14, or SU15 as its next node. SU11 does the following calculations: 
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Prob. of PU 
presenceorder 
𝐕𝐒𝐔 
SU13 0.331 4 2 0.34 2 0 1.5 
SU14 0.403 8 3 0.21 1 0 2.4 
SU15 0.372 2 1 0.76 3 0 2.1 
 
Based on the objective function calculation results and according to the routing algorithm, SU11 
chooses SU13 as its next hop. 
The best path includes SU0SU2SU5SU8SU11SU13 
 
At SU13 
SU13 can choose SU16 or SU17 as its next. SU13 does the following calculations: 




Prob. of PU 
presenceorder 
𝐕𝐒𝐔 
SU16 0.381 5 2 0.34 2 0 1.5 
SU17 0.402 2 1 0.12 1 0 1.5 
 
Based on the objective function calculation results and according to the routing algorithm, SU16 
and SU17 are the best next hop for SU13. However, SU13 has to choose one of them. In this case 
the user that has a higher BL is chosen as the next hop; therefore, SU13 chooses SU16 as its next 
hop. 





SU16 chooses SU18 as its next hop because it has no other next hops. 
The best path is SU0SU2SU5SU8SU11SU13SU16SU18 
Hence, the path shown above is the best path and it is secure, which guarantees that no 
adversary node can overhear or alter it. If a message is sent over this path, the nodes in the 
path should forward the message to its next hop with no problems assuming that the channels 
are error-free. 
5.4 Performance Evaluation 
5.4.1 Complexity Analysis 
In this section, we discuss the complexity of the routing algorithm proposed, including the 
sensing phase, in terms of number of messages exchanged (communication overhead) and 
memory usage (storage overhead). First for the communication overhead, the messages 
exchanged are sent by each sensing node and the CH. Each sensing cluster node sends sensing-
reputation reports to its CH, and each CH forwards the neighboring nodes’ information to each 
cluster node, which saves this information in NNI table. Suppose we have a cluster of 𝑁 SUs 
and each SU has certain neighbor nodes denoted by ‘𝑀, then number of messages exchanged 
by sensing nodes to its CH can be given approximately as 𝑁 ∗ 𝑀, while the CH sends 𝑁 
messages. Therefore, the total messages exchanged can be given approximately as 𝑁 ∗ 𝑀 +
𝑁, which is a complexity of second order (≈ 𝑂(𝑁2)). 
Second, with respect to the memory usage, each CH in our model requires 𝑁 ∗ 𝑁 entries of 
memory to save all the cluster nodes’ information, where 𝑁 is number of SUs in the cluster. 
While for each node in the cluster, it requires 𝑀 entries of memory in order to save its 
neighboring nodes’ information, where 𝑀 is the number of the neighboring nodes of an SU. 
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Hence, the total memory usage can be given approximately as 𝑁 ∗ 𝑁 + 𝑁 ∗ 𝑀, which is a 
complexity of second order (≈ 𝑂(𝑁2)). Increasing the number of SUs in the network increases 
the memory utilization in addition to the processing time at the CH level. 
5.4.2 Network Performance Measures  
In order to evaluate the performance of our routing algorithm, we consider multiple 
performance metrics. We apply our proposed routing algorithm to three different networks, 
each of which has a different number of SUs. Then, we compare the performance of our 
proposed approach with three other routing algorithms in terms of different metrics, which 
are: 
• Average end-to-end delay: represents the total time from packet generation at source 
node until packet reception at destination node.  
• Packet delivery ratio: represents the ratio of the number of packets received by the 
destination node to the number of packets generated by the source node. 
• Packet loss ratio: represents the packets that have been generated and transmitted by 
the source node but not received by the destination node. 
• Routing Overhead: represents the ratio of routing packets to the total number of 
packets sent over the network. 
5.4.3 Simulation Environment Setup 
The simulation model is built by using QualNet and analyzed through MATLAB. Table 5.3 
shows the simulation parameters used referring to [78] and [79]. We compare our proposed 
routing algorithm with three different state-of-the-art routing protocols used in CRNs, which 
are CAODV [66], SEARCH [63], and LAUNCH [73]. Four performance measures are used 
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in the comparison which are: average end-to-end delay, packet delivery ratio, packet loss ratio, 
and routing overhead. 
TABLE 5.3  SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
Parameter Value 
Channel Type Channel/WirelessChannel 
Radio propagation model Propagation/FreeSpace 
Network Interface Type Phy/WirelessPhy 
MAC Type Mac/802_11 
Interface queue type Queue/DropTail/PriQueue 
Antenna Model Antenna/OmniAntenna 
Max. Packets in queue 50 
# of mobile nodes [0-100], [100-500] 
Routing protocol PERP 
X- dimensions of topology 100 
Y- dimensions of topology 100 
# of channels/radio 20 
Packet size 512 bytes 
Application FTP 







5.4.4 Numerical Results and Performance Comparison 
In this section, we show the comparison between the proposed routing algorithm and the three 
routing algorithms mentioned before CAODV, SEARCH, and LAUNCH. Note that we did not 
simulate the other models and we just used their results shown in their research papers.  
Figure 5.2 illustrates the end-to-end delay in our proposed approach compared to that in 
CAODV. It is depicted that as the number of SUs increases the end-to-end delay decreases in both 
the approaches, however our proposed approach outperforms the CAODV routing algorithm i.e. 
the end-to-end delay is improved up to 60% when the number of SUs equals to hundred. The end-
102 
 
to-end delay decreases with the increment of number of SUs, because having more SUs will 
increase the chance of having more paths; therefore, the packets will be rerouted if one path is 
congested.   
We then compare the end-to-end delay in our proposed approach to the two other routing 
algorithms, SEARCH and LAUNCH, as shown in Figure 5.3. Incrementing the number of trusted 
SUs decreases the end-to-end delay; since, more nodes in the network, increases the number of 
paths. Our approach outperforms the other two routing approaches as secure nodes will forward 
packets to their next hop without delaying/dropping them. When the number of SUs is 500 users, 
the end-to-end delay is improved up to 41% and 80% compared to that in LAUNCH and SEARCH, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 5.2:  End-to-End Delay (Proposed Approach vs. CAODV). 





























Figure 5.3: End-to-End Delay (Proposed Approach vs. SEARCH vs. LAUNCH). 
 
Next, the packet delivery ratio in our proposed approach is compared with CAODV routing 
protocol as shown in Figure 5.4. It is clear from Figure 5.4 that the packet delivery ratio increases 
with the increment of the number of trusted SUs in the network as multiple routes exist. It can reach 
up to 95% in our proposed approach compared to that in CAODV. On the other hand, we compare 
the packet loss ratio in our proposed routing algorithm with two other routing algorithms, which 
are LAUNCH and SEARCH as shown in Figure 5.5. Under the simulation scenario used to measure 
the packet loss ratio in the three routing algorithms, it is clear that the packet loss ratio decreases 
rapidly when more trusted SUs are participating in routing the packets over the network. When the 
number of trusted SUs is equal to 100 users, the packet loss ratio is equal to 100%, 80%, and 70% 
in SEARCH, LAUNCH, and our proposed approach, respectively.  





























           
 






















































Figure 5.4: Packet Delivery Ratio (Proposed Approach vs. CAODV). 
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Figure 5.5:  Packet Loss Ratio (Proposed Approach vs. SEARCH vs. LAUNCH). 
 
Our proposed routing algorithm succeeds in having the minimum packet loss ratio compared to 
that in SEARCH and LAUNCH, which shows that our proposed approach outperforms the 
SEARCH and LAUNCH routing algorithms. 
Next, Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 compare the routing overhead in our proposed approach with 
CAODV, SEARCH, and LAUNCH routing algorithms. In Figure 5.6, the routing overhead 
represents the ratio of the routing packets to the total number of  packets sent over the network.  It 
is clear that the routing overhead decreases when the number of available channels increases; since, 
the nodes have more channels for sending more routing requests. Our proposed approach 
outperforms the CAODV and keeps the routing overhead at a minimum ratio compared to that in 
CAODV. In Figure 5.7, we measure the routing overhead in terms of number of packets routed 
over the network. It is clear that the routing overhead increases with the increase of the number of 
SUs; however, our proposed approach has a lower routing overhead compared to that in SEARCH 




Figure 5.6: Comparison of Routing Overhead (CAODV vs. Proposed Approach). The Routing 
overhead is measured as No. of Routing Packets / Total No. of Packets). 
 
Figure 5.7:  Routing Overhead (Proposed Approach vs. SEARCH vs. LAUNCH). 
 






























































Next, in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5, we compare our proposed approach to the CAODV, 
LUANCH, and SEARCH routing protocols in terms of the routing metrics used and the 
characteristics that they can support. It is depicted in Table 5.4 that the different routing algorithms 
combine multiple routing metrics to fulfill different goals of finding the best paths; however, they 
do not consider security as a routing metric. Therefore, their algorithms are vulnerable to attacks 
and they do not properly work in case of adversary nodes participate in route establishment. While 
in our approach, security is used as a routing metric; therefore, adversary nodes are identified and 
eliminated from participating in route establishment. 
 In Table 5.5, we compare the different routing protocols based on different characteristics 
that they can support. These characteristics are: 
• Centralized/Distributed: in central routing algorithms, a central node collects the different 
nodes’ information and uses them to find the best path, while in distributed routing 
algorithms the different nodes participate in finding the best path over the network. 
• Route Maintenance Support: represents the routing algorithm’s ability to reconfigure the 
routes in case of PU presence. 
• Mobility Support: represents the routing algorithm ability of considering the mobility of 
SUs. 
• Common Control Channel: represents the routing algorithm requirement of having a pre-
set channel, which is known to all SUs and used to forward the routing packets. 
• Secure Routes: represents if the different paths are secure, as well as if the security is 
considered in finding the best paths. 
It is depicted that all the routing protocols support most of the characteristics and lack some of them; 
however, our proposed approach supports all of them. It fulfills the “route maintenance support” 
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characteristic as if a path is congested, the cluster nodes will reroute the packets through the back-
up paths, which are already found using the algorithm proposed. The “mobility support” feature is 
fulfilled in the proposed algorithm as if a node moves to another cluster, its information are 
forwarded to the CH of the new cluster; therefore, the cluster nodes can find new paths that include 
the new joining node.  Therefore, the proposed approach is shown to be a better choice to be applied 
in CRNs.  






SEARCH YES NO YES NO 
LAUNCH YES NO YES NO 
CAODV NO YES NO NO 
Proposed Approach YES YES YES YES 
 













SEARCH Distributed YES YES NO NO 
LAUNCH Distributed YES YES YES NO 
CAODV Distributed YES YES NO NO 





Figure 5.8:  The Results of Verifying the Proposed Routing Algorithm in the Scyther 
Environment. 
5.5 Verification through Scyther 
We verified the correctness of our routing algorithm by using a well-known verification tool namely 
Scyther [76]. We set up the verification environment by using the settings parameters shown 
previously in Table 3.4 (Chapter 3). We then, described the algorithm messages sent between the 
two entities, the joining node and the CH. After the verification run has completed, a “no attacks” 
messaged popped up as shown in Figures 5.8. It shows that our protocol is safe against the multiple 
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attacks (mentioned in Chapter 3), as “no attacks” break the verification process. Moreover, the 
“status” of each message is “OK, verified”, which means that each message has been received 
correctly by the destination with no alteration (i.e. same at it has been sent by the source). It is 
depicted in Figure 5.8 that our routing algorithm is secure and no attacks can eavesdrop on messages 
sent between the reporting node and the CH. Moreover, the sensing-reputation reports are sent and 
received safely by the reporting node and the CH. Therefore, we can depict from the verification 
process applied to our routing algorithm that the algorithm is effective in increasing the packet 
reception rates with effectively no overhead on the CH. The formal verification of the algorithm 
provided useful insights of the routing algorithm during its developing phase and indeed, helped in 
the algorithm development.                                     
5.6 Summary 
 Spectrum sensing is the main phase in making the CR technology an effective solution to the 
spectrum scarcity problem. However, investigating the reliability of sensing nodes is important, as 
the presence of adversary nodes can make the spectrum sensing results ineffective. Therefore, 
security of the sensing nodes has to be taken into consideration before data is being routed over the 
network. Analyzing nodes behavior during spectrum sensing is important in order to build secure 
routing protocols/algorithms that enhances the network performance and increases network 
reliability.  
Current routing mechanisms in CRNs do not consider security as a routing metric. They are 
focusing more on securing the routes messages exchange, which is important; however, considering 
security as a routing metric is also important to prevent intruders from targeting the networks, and 
therefore decreasing the network performance.  
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In this chapter, we propose a routing algorithm based on nodes’ behavior during the spectrum 
sensing phase. The routing algorithm uses security as a routing metric combined with other metrics. 
The proposed approach aims to build secure routes that include trusted sensing nodes, which 
improves the network performance in terms of end-to-end delay, packet delivery ratio and routing 
overhead. The simulation results show the performance of our proposed approach compared to 
other models. It improves the network performance measures, which increases the network security, 













6. Chapter 6:  Conclusion and Future Work 
6.1 Conclusion 
The number of subscriptions for commercial mobile services in the world is rapidly increasing. In 
fact, the increase in mobile subscriptions has been accompanied by the adoption of more 
sophisticated mobile devices with internet-access, such as smart phones and tablets. However, 
spectrum is a limited resource, and the "usable" spectrum range (given current technologies) is 
completely allocated to existing services. As a result, service providers over the world must rely 
on new technologies in order to meet the spectrum needs of new or growing services and to use 
the spectrum efficiently. The greater spectrum use efficiency can be achieved by adopting and 
applying innovative technologies (such as 5G wireless mobile broadband technologies and 
Cognitive Radio (CR) technology). However, as in any other type of wireless networks, cognitive 
radio networks (CRNs) are vulnerable to many security attacks (both passive and active) especially 
during the spectrum sensing phase. The radio technology itself is vulnerable to attacks as any radio 
frequency can be blocked or jammed when a transmitter sends a signal of adequate strength at the 
same frequency. There is no control over the behavior of these unlicensed users, which threatens 
the security of the licensed users. Therefore, stronger security mechanisms should be proposed to 
avoid the harmful effects of different attacks to the network performance. 
This research focuses on addressing the network security in the two main functionalities of 
cognitive radio networks, spectrum sensing and spectrum management. Securing the spectrum 
sensing process in CRN is very important as adversary nodes might behave in different abnormal 
ways to launch attacks that degrade the spectrum sensing reliability and therefore reduce the 
network security and throughput. A CR node cannot access the spectrum unless it has been 
authenticated by a reliable node. We propose a two-level secure authentication scheme in CRN 
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wherein the authenticating node and the joining node accept a key agreement. We adopt the 
advantages of using the public key and the symmetric key cryptography to secure the messages 
exchanged between the communicating nodes. The authentication process ends with assigning to 
each node a value called belief level (BL), which measures the node’s sensing reliability to 
participate in spectrum sensing and data transmission over the network. The belief level of each 
node is the key element of the proposed research; since, it is used to correctly monitor the sensing 
nodes’ behavior and detect the adversary nodes during the spectrum sensing phase as well as a 
routing metric during the spectrum management phase. Next, we proposed a collaborative 
approach during the spectrum sensing process that focuses on monitoring the nodes’ behavior. BL 
is used to make the final sensing decision and to identify the adversary nodes. It works as a 
proactive approach to passive attacks and as a reactive approach to active attacks. Finally, we 
proposed a routing algorithm based on the nodes’ behavior during spectrum sensing. The routing 
algorithm uses security (BL) as a routing metric combined with other metrics. The proposed 
approach aims at building secure routes that include trusted sensing nodes, which improves the 
network performance in terms of end-to-end delay, packet delivery ratio and routing overhead. 
The performance of the developed models is evaluated using simulation. The proposed 
authentication scheme, in comparison to the existing authentication approaches, reduces the 
number of cryptographic operations and the authentication time needed to complete the 
authentication process. The simulation results of the monitoring nodes behavior approach illustrate 
that the detection probability and the false alarm probability have improved. The simulation results 
of the routing algorithm suggested that the network security implicitly enhances the spectrum 




6.2 Future Work 
Many ideas can be applied to enhance the efficiency of the three developed models in this research. 
In the spectrum sensing phase, the way of forming the clusters, choosing the cluster heads, and 
exchanging the sensing results could be improved to further increase the accuracy of the spectrum 
sensing results. 
New encryption/decryption methods can be proposed to improve the security of message exchange 
between the different communicating nodes. Moreover, the method used for making final sensing 
decision can be improved by giving more weight to the nodes’ votes that have the correct sensing 
decision. 
The game theory can be applied to our routing approach to improve its performance. The nodes 
that form the best path can play a game to gain a higher profit from forwarding data through them. 
Optimization techniques can be used to make every communicating node achieve its highest 
quality of service (QoS) without interfering with other nodes. We have already enough experience 
in applying game theory [82-89], therefore we believe that applying the game theory leads to better 
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